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NOTICE TO HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE AND
OTHER BONA FIDE PURCHASERS UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE t
BRIAN A, BLUM*
Notice is the "legal cognizance of a fact."' The basis of the doctrine of
notice in commercial law is the principle that a person should be accountable
for his state of mind at the time he entered into a transaction. Information that
he possessed when contracting bears upon that state of mind and is frequently
an important consideration in determining his rights and obligations not only
vis-a-vis the other party to the transaction, but also in relation to third parties
whose rights may have been affected by the transaction.'
This article seeks to analyze the role and the nature of the doctrine of
notice as it is found in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. or Code). The
discussion will be divided into two parts. The first will deal with the general
principles of notice that underlie all of the articles of the U.C.C. Particular at-
tention will be paid to those principles applicable to the notice requirements of
a bona fide purchase. The second will examine the concept as it has developed
in relation to a special class of bona fide purchasers, the holder in due course of
a negotiable instrument. The doctrine of holder in due course is singled out for
special treatment because it has dominated the area of notice and has received
considerable attention by the courts, the commentators, and the U.C.C. drafts-
men. The holder in due course, however, cannot be viewed in total segrega-
tion. The general themes of the doctrine of notice permeate the U.C.C. as a
whole, and intertwine from one article to the next. Therefore, in treating notice
under separate heads, one is forced to remain conscious of the frequent overlap
.	 -
'1* Copyright © 1981 by Boston College Law School.
* B.A., University of the Witwatersrand (Johannesburg, South Africa), 1968; LL.B.,
University of the Witwatersrand, 1971; LL.M., University of Michigan. 1978; Assistant Pro-
fessor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School.
' G. BISPHAM, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 371 (5th ed. 1893) [hereinafter cited as
BISPHAM]. Long, Notice in Equity, 34 HARY, L. REV. 137, 140 (1920) [hereinafter cited as Long],
defines notice as "knowledge of a fact either actually possessed by a person or imputed to him by
law." See also J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 1109 (4th ed. 1918) [hereinafter cited as
POMEROY].
"The legal relations of a person are frequently affected by his knowledge, or by the
existence of facts because of which he is treated, for the purpose in question, as if he had knowl-
edge. To express the idea that legal relations may be changed because of knowledge, or some-
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and to view the two parts which follow as different in emphasis and detail
rather than in fundamental content.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF NOTICE UNDER THE U.C.C.
A. Notice as a Factor in Bona Fide Purchase
The concept of bona fide purchase has had an association with the doc-
trine of notice both at common law and under the U.C.C. Under early law,
when courts were confronted with a dispute between a person who had ac-
quired a right in property and one who had a prior conflicting right in the same
property, they favored the prior right on the basis that first acquired interests
should be protected against rights that come into existence later in time. This
solution accorded with the general principle of equity jurisprudence that a prior
equity prevails where two equities are in conflict. 3 In time, however, both the
demands of equity and the exigencies of commerce called for the relaxation of
that rule in a number of areas. It was recognized that the ends of justice and
commerce would be well served by insulating the rights of certain transferees of
property from the assaults of third parties who claimed a prior interest. Yet the
prior equities were strong and would not give way entirely. Accordingly, in
order to prevail, it was necessary for the subsequent purchaser to show that he
acquired the property in good faith, for value, and without notice of the prior
adverse claim — that he was a bona fide purchaser. 4
The traditional conception of bona fide purchase was preserved in the
U.C.C. 3 and manifests itself in many Code provisions. The most obvious ex-
amples are the holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under article 3, 6
and the holder of a negotiable document under article 7. 7 In addition, there are
thing equivalent to it in the particular case, the word 'notice' is used." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY S 9, Comment (a) (1958).
' Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L. J. 1057 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as Gilmore]; BISPHAM, supra note 1, at 369-71, traces the roots of the doctrine
of notice. He notes that in conflicts between legal titles it was not relevant that the later party had
knowledge of an adverse claim when he acquired his rights. However, where equitable rights
were concerned, a person who acquired title with knowledge that it was affected by an equity
would take subject to that equity; see also Long, supra note 1, at 138; J. STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 5 411, at 399 (1836) [hereinafter cited as STORY].
4 This short account is obviously a broad generalization, subject to myriad qualifica-
tions, No attempt is being made to encapsulate the growth or extent of the doctrine of bona fide
purchase in a few sentences. This passage merely serves to alert the reader to the fact that the
modern-day doctrine of bona fide purchase has ancient roots which can be traced both to equity
jurisprudence and to mercantile common law. A fuller account of the development and bounds of
the doctrine in different areas of the law may be found in POMEROY, supra note 1, at SS 735-785;
Gilmore, supra note 3; STORY, supra note 3, at 396:
5 There is no definition of bona fide purchaser in the general definition section,
U.C.C. S 1-201.
6 The holder in due course's ancestry is discussed in text at notes 102-28 infra.
7 U.C.C. 5 7-501(4) states that a negotiable document of title is "duly negotiated"
when "it is negotiated . . . to a holder who purchases it in good faith, without notice of any
defense against or claim to it on the part of any person and for value . . ." Id. The section goes
on to list as a further requirement that it be taken in the regular course of business or financing.
Id. The heavily mercantile nature of negotiable documents has resulted in the retention of this
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a number of other sections that define and deal with bona fide purchasers, for
example, section 6-110, which relates to purchase from a bulk transferor, 8 sec-
tion 8-302, which governs purchases of securities, 9 and section 9-301(1)(c),
which preserves the rights of one who purchases property subject to an unper-
fected security interest.'° The concept of bona fide purchase also underlies the
status of buyer in the ordinary course of business as defined in section 1-201
(9)," and consequently it is imported into other sections of the Code where the
quality of being in the ordinary course of business is a prerequisite for protec-
tion. 12
latter requirement as an ingredient of holding in due course. See Comment 1 to 5 7-501. The sec-
tion is interpreted in Cleveland v. McNabb, 312 F. Supp. 155 (W.D. Tenn. 1970). Gilmore,
supra note 3, at 1076-81, traces the history of negotiable documents or title, and in so doing illus-
trates that the protection of a bona fide purchaser in this area is a rather recent development.
° U.C.C. 6-110(2) provides: "When the title of a transferee to property is subject to
a defect . . . then ... a purchaser for value in good faith and without . . . notice [of such defect]
takes free of such defect." Id.
U.C.C. 5 8-302 defines a bona fide purchaser of a security as one who purchases for
value, in good faith and without notice of an adverse claim. Upon attaining that status he ac-
quires rights to the security free of any such adverse claims. U.C.C. S 8-302(3). Prior to the
enactment of the U.C.C. securities were governed, if they were bonds, by the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law (N.I.L.) and, if they were share certificates, by the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.
Under those statutes a bona fide purchaser was given rights similar to those contained in the
present U.C.C. 5 8-302. Bonds were considered to be negotiable instruments within the Negoti-
able Instruments Law so that its provisions relating to holding in due course applied to them.
Those provisions are discussed fully below. Section 7(1) of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act pro-
vided that if there were certain specified defects in the title to the certificate its transfer could be
rescinded except as against a purchaser for value in good faith and without notice of any facts
making the transfer wrongful.
'° Whitmire v. Keylon, 12 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1203, 1208-09 (Tenn. 1973).
A buyer in the ordinary course of business is one who "in good faith and without
knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third
party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of that
kind . . ." U.C.C. 5 1-201(9). Quite apart from the course of business requirement, this pur-
chaser does not quite fit into the traditional mold of a bona fide purchaser. Although the good
faith element is expressly called for, and the value element is implicit in the word "buys," the re-
quirement of notice in an objective sense is not present. He will only be disqualified from the
status if he actually knew that the sale was in violation of third party rights. That test is an entire-
ly subjective one, and is more closely allied to the question of his good faith than to any concep-
tion of notice.
Prior to 1956, the predecessor of this section of the U.C.C. had no requirement of good
faith and lack of knowledge. Those requirements were added upon the recommendation of the
New York Law Revision Commission. According to the reasons for change published in the 1956
Recommendations of the Editorial Board of the U.C.C., "[t]he 'without knowledge' addition
spells out one important type of dishonesty."
The wording of the section closely parallels that of its predecessor, 5 1 of the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act, which called for new value, good faith, and lack of actual knowledge. The
import of the distinction between subjective knowledge and objective notice is dealt with below.
" See, e.g. ,U.C.C. 5 2-403(2), U.C.C. 9-307 (1). Section 2-403 provides for a slightly
deviant type of bona fide purchaser. The relevant portion of the section allows "[a] person with
voidable title . . . to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value." At first blush the
definition has a missing ingredient — it does not require that the purchaser lack notice of any
defect in title. If the section is compared with two of its predecessors, section 24 of the Uniform
Sales Act, and section 9(2) of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, both of which required lack of
notice, the omission becomes more glaring. The omission of the notice standard in the case of
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The three common law elements of a bona fide purchase — value, good
faith, and lack of notice — are thus well established under the U.C.C. This ar-
ticle, of course, focuses on the latter of these three ingredients and much of the
following discussion of the doctrine of notice is oriented towards its application
in the context of bona fide purchase."
good faith purchasers is puzzling. It is possible that the term "good faith purchaser" was simply
a translation of its Latin equivalent and that the omission of the notice requirement was inadver-
tent. The indications, however, are to the contrary. The official comment to the May 1949 Draft
of the equivalent section (there numbered 2-405) states "three basic requirements which must
be fulfilled before the purchaser can take a better title than his transferor has. He must take in
good faith as that term is defined in the article. There must be delivery to the transferee. The
transferee must give value for the goods." These words would indicate that the omission was in-
tentional. One court, at least, has so treated the omission of the requirement of notice. In re
Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976) declared: "Lack of knowledge of outstanding
claims is necessary to the common law [bona fide purchaser] and is similarly expressly required
in many Code [bona fide purchaser] and priority provisions. . . . But the Code's definition of an
Article Two good faith purchaser does not expressly or impliedly include lack of knowledge of
third-party claims as an element." Id. at 1243-44 (citations omitted).
In the case of a merchant, the specific definition of good faith in U.S.C. 2-103(b) im-
poses, in addition to the general subjective honesty test of 5 1-201(19), a requirement of "the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." Therefore, in deter-
mining whether a merchant qualifies as a good faith purchaser under 5 2-403, the court is able to
conduct an inquiry into his subjective honesty, and also to investigate whether or not his behavior
measures up to the objective standards of fair dealing in the trade. In come cases that will allow
an inquiry into the question of whether or not he had notice of a defect in the sellers' title. Even
where a merchant is involved, however, this general objective test of good faith will not necessari-
ly be coextensive with the standards set for establishing the lack of notice as a prerequisite for
bona fide purchase.
In the case of non-merchants, the objective definition of good faith in 5 2-103(b) does not
apply, and the inquiry will simply be whether the person took in good faith as defined generally
in 5 1-201(19). Notice of prior or adverse claims will be irrelevant except insofar as they bear
upon the question of his honesty.
Those courts and commentators that have interpreted 5 2-403 for the most part have not
required the absence of notice as an element of good faith purchase under the section, See In re
Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976); National Car Rental v. Fox, 500 P.2d 1148
(Ariz. 1972); In re Bowman, 25 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 738 (N.D. Ga. 1978); Maurice Shire, Inc.
v. Gerald Modell, Inc., 19 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1096 (N.Y. 1976); Atlas Auto Rental Corp. v.
Weisberg, 54 Misc. 2d 168, 281 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1967); Landrum v. Arbruster, 28 N.C. App.
250, 220 S.E.2d 842 (1976). Cases such as National Car Rental illustrate the sometimes fine
dividing line between cases in which suspicious circumstances will lead to a finding of bad faith,
and those in which it will lead to a finding only of objective notice. See also 3 WILLISTON ON
SALES 376 n.17 (4th ed. 1974); R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 515 (1970);
R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES & BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UCC 5 10.06(1), at 10-48
n.17. Cf. Hollis v. Chamberlain, 243 Ark. 201, 419 S.W.2d 116 (1967), in which the court con-
fused good faith purchase under 5 2-401 with bona fide purchase generally, and similarly lumped
together the issues of good faith and notice.
13 It is not suggested that the notice provisions in the U.C.C. are only of relevance in
the area of bona tide purchase. There are situations far removed from any issue of bona fide pur-
chase in which an inquiry into when the giving or receipt of notice is apposite. For example, the
presence or absence of notice may in some cases have a bearing on the rights of parties to a trans-
action inter se. The U.C.C. abounds with situations in which proper notification is a condition
precedent to the creation, enjoyment or protection of rights. The following random selection
illustrates the point: Appropriate notification by a seller of goods is often an element in the proper
delivery of goods, U.C.C. 5 2-503(1), or will bear upon his rights to cure a defective delivery,
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To understand notice requirements in this context, it is first necessary to
recognize the distinction between taking without notice and another element of
a bona fide purchase, taking in good faith. Undeniably, there is a close rela-
tionship between taking without notice and taking in good faith. The connect-
ing link between the two concepts lies in the factual undergrowth from which
they emerge. It often happens that the very facts that establish that a purchaser
had notice of an adverse interest in property will also cast doubt upon his good
faith in purchasing it." In some areas that factual proximity has had the effect
of merging the concepts so that they appear as a single standard to be satisfied
by the same criteria. This amalgamation became established doctrinally in
some areas of the law, so that the test for bona fide purchase became a unilater-
al one, involving only value and good faith. The essence of notice was merely
an ingredient in defending the issue of good faith. It is one of the theses of this
article, however, that such a merger is not justifiable under the U.C.C. The
U.C.C. requires that both good faith and lack of notice be established as a pre-
requisite for the status of bona fide purchaser and prescribes different stand-
ards for the determination of those separate elements. In certain situations a
single set of facts may establish both elements, but this must be recognized as a
consequence of the factual setting rather than the legal principle. In the follow-
ing discussion, this theme of the interrelationship between notice and good
faith will constantly recur.
B. The Definition of Notice Under the U. C. C.
Notice is defined in section 1-201(25) of the U.C.C. The section provides not
only a definition but also a statement of principle that applies to every one of
the large number of sections in which the words "notice," "knowledge," or
"reason to know" have been used. The definition section is therefore pervasive
and operates as a springboard to the interpretation of any section in which
notice has a bearing on the rights of a party. Section 1-201(25) reads as follows:
A person has "notice" of a fact when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in
question he has reason to know that it exists.
A person "knows" or has "knowledge" of a fact when he has actual
knowledge of it. "Discover" or "learn" or a word or phrase of
similar import refers to knowledge rather than to reason to know.
U.C.C. § 2-508, or will affect his remedies on breach, U.C.C. 5 2-706. Similarly, a buyer's right
of rejection, U.C.C. § 2-602, revocation, U.C.C. § 2-608, and his right to damages, U.C.C. §§
2-607, 2-714, will in many cases depend upon notification. A holder's right against prior parties
is often dependent upon proper notice of dishonor, U.C.C. § 3-501. The protection of a bulk
transferee against creditors of the transferor is heavily dependent upon proper notification,
U.C.C. §§ 6-104, 6-105. In some cases a secured party is also required to give notice in order to
protect his rights. See, e.g. ,U.C.C. §§ 9-318, 9-312(3).
14 See, e.g., Branch Banking & Trust v. Gill, 293 N.C. 164, 184, 237 S.E.2d 21, 32
(1977); In re Itemlab, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 5, 8 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
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The time and circumstances under which a notice or notification
may cease to be effective are not determined by this Act.' 5
In essence the section states that a person has notice in three different situa-
tions: first, where he has actual knowledge of the relevant facts; second, where
he has received a notice or notification of the relevant facts; and third, where he
has knowledge of other facts which lead to the inference that he should have
known the relevant facts. In the remainder of this subsection the parameters of
these categories shall be explored.
1. Actual Knowledge — The Distinction Between Notice and Knowledge
As previously noted, the doctrine of notice is a formula by which the law
ascertains whether or not a person should be treated as having knowledge of
some fact at a given point in time. The ultimate question is whether or not the
person had knowledge of the fact. The means of answering it is through the
doctrine of notice. It follows that notice and knowledge are intimately related
concepts. They are not, however, interchangeable. If the law required simply
that knowledge be determinative of legal rights, there would need to be only a
factual inquiry into the state of mind of the relevant person. The doctrine of
notice, however, goes beyond knowledge encompassing situations where
knowledge, though not necessarily possessed, is nevertheless attributed to a
person. Thus, the distinction between knowledge and notice lies in the dif-
ference between factual and legal conclusions.
Knowledge is the narrower factual concept. It describes the state of the
conscious mind of a person and connotes a conscious awareness of fact or con-
dition. By contrast, notice is a legal conclusion, a term of art which may or may
not be coextensive with knowledge.' 6 The distinction may be illustrated by a
simple example. If P purchases property from S knowing that T has an existing
interest in the property, then P's knowledge of that interest will usually also
constitute legal notice of the interest. However, this is not always true. For ex-
ample, where a statute requires T to record his interest in public records in
order to effectuate it against other purchasers from S, P's factual knowledge of
T's interest will not be the equivalent of legal notice. Legal notice of T's inter-
est would be constituted only by a proper recording, and P's knowledge or lack
of it is immaterial. Even in the absence of a recording statute, there are situa-
tions in which P will be treated as having knowledge that he does not actually
possess. These situations usually occur where it is found that P's lack of knowl-
edge arises from some fault or neglect on his part.
The U.C.C., in accordance with pre-Code conceptions, carefully distin-
guishes knowledge from notice. While the whole of section 1-201(25) defines
situations in which notice will be present, only subsection (a) of that section
' 5	S 1-201(25).
16 Seavey, Notice Through an Agent, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1916) [hereinafter cited as
Seavey]; Merrill, The Anatomy of Notice, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Mer-
rill]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 5 9, Comment (c); Long, supra note 1, at 140, 141.
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relates to actual knowledge." The distinction is not merely a theoretical nicety.
Throughout the U.C.C.. the draftsmen have used it deliberately to separate
those cases in which a person is accountable only for his factual state of mind,"
from those in which he is accountable not only for his actual awareness of facts,
but also for that awareness attributed to him by the wider principles of notice."
2. The Distinction Between Actual and Constructive Notice
Notice itself traditionally has been divided into two sub-categories — ac-
tual notice and constructive notice. This dichotomy has been preserved in the
U.C.C. In its extreme form actual notice coincides with knowledge. In that
form, the person charged with notice would have, as a matter of proven fact,
actual, present, and conscious awareness of the facts with which he is charged.
Conversely, constructive notice represents, in its clearest sense, a legal pre-
sumption that the person charged with notice is aware of facts that are recorded
or published in a prescribed form. The person is treated as having knowledge
"7 The language in question is that which provides that actual knowledge of a fact con-
stitutes notice of it. The idea is further expanded by the definition of "knows," "knowledge,"
"discover," and "learn" in the penultimate two sentences of subsection (25).
' 1' Thus, the provision in 5 6-104(3) that excuses a transferee from responsibility for
omissions from a list of creditors drawn up by a bulk transferor unless he has knowledge of such
omission, has been interpreted to penalize such a bulk transferee only in the case of actual knowl-
edge of the omission. Federal Ins. Co. v. Pipeco Steel Corp., 125-NJ. Super. 563, 312 A.2d 510
(1973); Adrian Tabin Corp. v. Climax Boutique, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 210, 313 N.E.2d 66, 356
N.Y.S.2d. 606 (1974).
Similarly, knowledge of the contents of a financing statement provided for in 5 9-401(2)
means actual knowledge. In re Computer Careers Inst., 9 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 930, 932 (E.D.
Tenn. 1971); see also Matter of Luckenbill, 156 F. Supp. 129, 131 (E. D. Pa. 1957); In re Dennis
Mitchell Indus., Inc., 419 F.2d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 1969); Franklin Nat'l Investment Corp. v.
American Swiss Parts Co., 42 Mich. App. 211, 214, 201 N.W.2d 673, 674 (1972); In re Komfo
Products Corp., 2 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1107 (ED. Pa. 1965); In re County Green, 438Y. Supp.
693, 697 (W. D. Va. 1977). But see In re Enark Indus., Inc., 19 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 685 (N.Y.
1976). Cf. First State Bank v. United Dollar Stores, 571 P.2d 444, 448 (Okla. 1977), in which the
court exhibits some confusion as to the meaning of knowledge as used in 5 9-401(2) and defines it
as actual knowledge and reason to have actual knowledge.
Knowledge of a security interest under S 9-301(1)(b) (1962 Official Version) means ac-
tual knowledge. United States v. Ed Lusk Constr. Co., 504 F.2d 328, 331 (10th Cir. 1974); Gulf
Oil Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 503 S.W.2d 300, 307 (Tex. 1973); Clark Oil & Refining Co. v. Lid-
dicoat, 65 Wis. 2d 612, 223 N.W.2d 530 (1974).
Knowledge of a purchaser under 5 9-301(1)(c) means actual knowledge. Whitmire v.
Keylon, 12 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1203, 1208-09 (Tenn. 1973); Bloom v. Hilty, 427 Pa. 463, 468,
234 A.2d 860, 862 (1967).
Knowledge of a purchaser under S 9-313(4)(a) (1962 Official Version) means actual
knowledge. Northwest Equipment Sales Co. v. Western Packers, Inc., 20 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
210, 214 (9th Cir. 1976).
A general discussion on the significance of knowledge in article 9 priority contests (under
the 1962 official text) may be found in Felsenfeld, Knowledge as a Factor in Determining Priorities under
the U. C. C. , 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 246 (1967).
19 E.g. , Victory Nat'l Bank v. Oklahoma State Bank, 520 P.2d 675, 678 .(Okla. 1973);
National Trailer Convoy Co., Inc. v. Mount Vernon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 420 P.2d 889, 893
(Okla. 1966).
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of the facts whether or not he actually knew them. The presumption arises en-
tirely out of proper completion of some recognized formal act.
Although the distinction between actual and constructive notice is universal-
ly recognized, the dividing line between the two forms of notice has been the
subject matter of some dispute. The older commentators on the doctrine of
notice tended to base their differentiation on the question of whether notice was
established by evidence of knowledge or as a result of some presumption or in-
ference of law. This distinction between actual and constructive notice was
blurred, however, because different commentators and courts drew the border-
line in different places. For example, Story treated as actual notice only those
cases in which direct evidence of knowledge was established. 20 In cases where
notice was inferred as a result of a presumption of law built upon circumstances
that reasonably should have promoted further inquiry, Story classed the notice
as constructive. A similar distinction was advocated by Bispham who defined
actual notice as notice established either directly or by implication from the
facts and constructive notice as notice established by an irrebuttable conclusion
of law. 2 ' Pomeroy's test was whether notice was determined by inference of
facts from evidence, in which case it is actual notice, or whether it was based on
a presumption of law arising from certain factual findings, in which case it is
constructive notice. 22 These various theories presented few problems in clear-
cut cases in which actual knowledge was proven, or in which there was a clear
legislative enactment that created a fiction of notice regardless of any actual ap-
preciation of the facts. In the grey area in between these poles, however, confu-
sion reigned. In cases where there was some imputation of knowledge, it was
difficult to decide whether the notice fell on one side of the line to become ac-
tual, or on the other to become constructive. The conflicts in the commentaries
mirrored those in the courts."
More recent writers have devised a test with a stronger rational base. It
applies a less flexible and more constant standard. For example, Seavey advo-
cated a straightforward test for distinguishing between actual and constructive
notice." The test eschewed the evidence-oriented approach that caused the
prior confusion, and fixed upon the heart of the real distinction between con-
structive and actual notice. It revolved around the question of whose actions
are relevant, the party claiming the rights, or the party who is to be charged
with the notice. If, on the one hand, the state of mind of the party to be charged
was conclusive of whether or not he takes subject to the prior claim, then any
evidence and presumptions from evidence that go to establishing this state of
20 STORY, supra note 13, at 387.
21
 BISPHAM, supra note I, at 379. Bispham's fact/law distinction brings him a little
closer to the later writers discussed infra at notes 24-25.
12 POMEROY, supra note 1, at 1108.
23 The confusion is well described by Long, supra note 1, at 151; 1 M. MERRILL ON
NOTICE SS 14-17 (1952). A short survey of the pre-Code writings and cases on the doctrine of
notice can be found in Study of the U. C. C. Article I — General Provisions, 1 N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n
Report 1269 (1955) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n Report].
24 Seavey, supra note 16, at 2, 10. See also Merrill, supra note 16, at 427; Long, supra
note 1, at 151.
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mind must be seen as establishing actual notice. If, on the other hand, the state
of mind of the party to be charged was irrelevant and the only inquiry was
whether or not some formal act was properly performed by the party seeking to
protect the prior rights, then the notice resulting from the formal act was con-
structive notice or, as Seavey terms it, "absolute notice."
Seavey's distinction has formed the basis of the definition of notice in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency." This school of thought admits of only one
situation in which constructive notice will be imputed to a person. This occurs
where an irrebuttable conclusion of notice is created against one person as a
result of the act of another. In such a case, the act, typically registration or
notification in some form, is prescribed by a law that provides that the act itself
creates legal consequences against all persons in the class affected, regardless of
whether notice or knowledge on their part can be established. The state of
mind of the person to be charged with notice is irrelevant to the inquiry, which
centers solely around the question of whether or not the formal act was correct-
ly and adequately performed. This distinction is far preferable to the one sug-
gested by Story, Bispham, and Pomeroy because it distinguishes the two
categories of notice on the basis of the one feature which in fact distinguishes
them. Constructive notice is essentially formal in nature, while actual notice
rests upon the appreciation of the relevant party.
25 Section 9 of the Restatement provides:
(1) A person has notice of a fact if he knows the fact, has reason to know it, should
know it, or has been given notification of it.
(2) A person is given notification of a fact by another if the latter
(a) informs him of the fact by adequate or specified means or of other facts
from which he has reason to know or should know the facts; or
(b) does an act which, under the rules applicable to the transaction, has the
same effect on the legal relations of the parties as the acquisition of knowledge or
reason to know.
(3) A person has notice of a fact if his agent has knowledge of the fact, reason to
know it or should know it, or has been given a notification of it, under circum-
stances coming within the rules applying to the liability of a principal because of
notice to his agent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 5 9 (1958).
The dichotomy between notice deriving from the state of mind of the person charged, S
9(1), and that deriving from the act of the person giving the notice, 5 9(2), is clearly demarcated,
and is reinforced by the comments to the section. Comment (f) states: "knowledge is subjective
to one having it . • . Notification, however, is a juristic act which determines the rights of the
parties, sometimes irrespective of knowledge by the recipient." Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
TRUSTS S 297 (1959):
A person has notice of a breach of trust if
(a) he knows or should know of the breach of trust, or
(b) by statute or otherwise he is subjected to the same liabilities as though he knew
or should have known of the breach of trust, even though in fact he did not know
and had no reason to know of the breach of trust.
Comment (b) emphasizes that "lip' an instrument is properly recorded [under a
recording statute), third persons are thereby given notice of the provisions of the
instrument to the extent provided for by the statute, even though in fact they have
no knowledge or reason to know of the existence or provisions of the instrument."
Id.
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The distinction is not merely one of theory or semantics. If the scope of a
formal or absolute standard for notice is not clearly defined there is the danger
of impermissible fictions or presumptions being raised in cases where they are
not appropriate. It is important that the courts understand when notice is to be
determined by legal fiction and when it is to be established only on the facts
proved directly or by inference. 26
The U.C.C. does not expressly distinguish constructive notice from actual
notice. In fact, the term "constructive notice" does not appear in the U.C.C.
at all. Nevertheless, it is clear that the draftsmen sought to promulgate a test in
the U.C.C. which is in line with that set out by Seavey and the Restatement
(Second) of Agency. This intent does not appear from the express wording of
section 1-201(25) nor from the official comments to the section. 27
 A proper con-
struction of the wording of the section, however, can compel no other conclu-
sion but that constructive notice, in the sense of formal absolute and irrebut-
table notice, can be used in situations where it is specifically provided for in the
U.C.C." or in some other statute that is clearly applicable under the circum-
stances. 25
3. Constructive Notice Under the U.C.C.
Under the U.C.C. there are several situations where authority may be
found for charging a person with constructive notice. These situations can be
arranged into three broad categories. The first is where a person is charged
26
 Sometimes courts confuse the terminology, even under the U.C.C. In Miriani v.
Rodman and Renshaw, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1011, 1013 (N.D. Ill. 1973), the court incorrectly
used the term constructive knowledge when it referred to the "reason to know" test of
5 1-201(25)(c). See also Ibanez v. Farmers Underwriters Ass'n, 14 Cal. 3d 390, 534 P.2d 1336,
121 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1975).
" The same is true of the official comments to prior drafts of the section, which dates
back in its present form to the 1950 draft. In the 1949 Official Draft of the U.C.C. there was no
provision in article 1 equivalent to the present 5 1-201(25). Instead, the definition of notice was
found in some of the specific articles. For the purposes of article 8, notice was defined in 8-104.
Although the definition was not as detailed as that in 5 1-201(25), the official comment expresses
an enlightening and, it is submitted, a generally applicable observation: "Under this article,
notice contemplates actual notice and 'reason to know.' Constructive notice is rejected as a
general concept and is recognized only in those specific instances where express provision is
made . . . ." U.C.C. 5 8-104 (1949 Official Draft).
" Matter of Luckenbill, 156 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1957); Federal Ins. Co. v. Pipeco
Steel Corp., 125 N.J. Super. 563, 312 A.2d 510 (1973); First State Bank v. United Dollar Stores,
571 P.2d 444 (Okla. 1977). Section 9-318, which requires notification to an accounts debtor, re-
quires actual notification and the filing of a financing statement does not constitute proper
notification under the section. In re Chase Manhattan Bank v. New York, 367 N.Y.S.2d 580
(App. Div. 1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 590, 357 N.E.2d 366, 388 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1976); Bank of Salt
Lake City v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 534 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975). Similarly,
filing will not constitute notice to a holder in due course under 5 3-304(5). See National Surety
Fire v. Mazzara, 268 So. 2d 814 (Ala. 1972); Stewart v. Thornton, 116 Ariz. 107, 568 P.2d 414
(1977).
29
 It is not uncommon for notice by recording to be provided for in a statute which
dovetails with the U.C.C. Certificate of title statutes are an obvious example. They provide for
the perfection of a security interest in the goods covered by the certificate (typically automobiles)
by notation on the certificate. Such a mode of perfection is recognized expressly by S 9-302(3)(b).
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with notice of a fact because he received notification of it. The second is where
a person is held to have constructive notice of facts contained in the body of a
negotiable instrument, document, or security. The third is where a person is
charged with facts appropriately recorded in public records. 3 °
Constructive notice through notification is the only category that applies
generally throughout the U.C.C. because it is the only one provided for in sec-
tion 1-201(25). The other forms of constructive notice are confined to the
specific articles in which they appear. Section 1-201(25)(b) provides that notice
of a fact will be imputed to a party if he receives notification of that fact. Sec-
tion 1-201(26) states that a person 3 ' receives notification when it comes to his
attention or where, in appropriate circumstances, it is delivered to his place of
business or to a place nominated by him. 32 Beyond its general application
through section 1-201(25), constructive notice by notification is also provided
for in several specific U.C.C. provisions. Under these provisions it is not
always necessary for notification to be received. In some instances notification
need only be given. Notice is given in terms of section 1-201(26) when a person
takes such steps as may be reasonably required to inform the party to be
notified in the ordinary course. 33
 Each section of the U.C.C. that calls for
notification will itself indicate specifically the yardstick by which notification is
to be measured. Some allow notification simply by the completion of the act of
giving notice, 34 while others require not only that notice be given, but that it be
received as well." Section 1-201(25) falls into the latter category, and therefore
constructive notice of a fact will only be attributed to a party who has received
notice.
When such notation is duly made, it operates as constructive notice of the interest o1 "the secured
party. In re Pollack, 3 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 267 (D. Conn. 1966); National Trailer Convoy Co.
v. Mount Vernon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 420 P.2d 889, 893 (Okla. 1966).
" A related form of constructive notice is that arising from the presumption that parties
know the law. Thus, in Dempsey Tegler & Co. v. Otis Oil & Gas Corp., 293 F. Supp. 1383,
1387 (D. Colo. 1968), the court suggested that, where a Colorado statute required a counter
signature on a share certificate, a purchaser of the certificate would be on notice of an irregularity
where the counter signature was absent. See also Stewart v. Thornton, 116 Ariz. 107, 568 P.2d
414 (1977).
" "Person" includes both individuals and organizations. See U.C.C.  1 1-201(30). The
specific rules regarding notice to organizations are discussed in text at notes 96-101 infra.
" Section 1-201(26) provides:
A person "notifies" or "gives" a notice or notification to another by taking such
steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other in ordinary course
whether or not such other actually comes to know of it. A person "receives" a
notice or notification when
(a) it comes to his attention; or
(b) it is duly delivered at the place of business through which the contract was
made or at any other place held out by him as the place for receipt of such com-
munications.
" See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 973 (5th
Cir. 1976); Steelman v. Associates Discount Corp., 121 Ga. App. 649, 175 S.E.2d 62 (1970);
Mallicoat v. Volunteer Finance, 57 Tenn. App. 106, 112.13, 415 S.W.2d 347, 350 (1966).
" There are many such sections. The point is illustrated by a few random examples of
sections which by use of the words "notify" or "give notice" require only that notice be given,
irrespective of receipt. E.g., U.C.C. SS 2-207(2)(c), 2-503, 2-503(1), 2-504(c), 2-508, 2-615(c),
2-705(3).
" See Comment 26 to U.C.C. 1 1.201. A few random examples of sections which re-
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The term "received" is a term of art, and does not necessarily require the
actual acquisition of the relevant information by the person to be notified.
Receipt may occur in two settings in accordance with section 1-201(26). The
first arises where the notification given comes to the attention of the recipient.
The second occurs where the notification is delivered to the recipient but does
not necessarily come to his attention.
Under the first situation, it is significant that section 1-201(26)(a), literally
interpreted, requires only that the notification, not its subject matter, come to
the attention of the person to be charged. Under that interpretation, the re-
quirements of section 1-201(25)(b) are fulfilled when the recipient becomes
aware of the notification, whether or not its actual content is assimilated by
him. For example, if notice of a fact is given in a letter sealed in an envelope,
the crucial event for the purposes of establishing notice under 1-201(26)(a) is
the receipt of the envelope, even if it is never opened and read. Obviously the
subject matter of the letter is relevant in order to assess whether the act of
notification is properly performed, but that is a different issue from whether
notice is received." Although some may urge a less literal approach to section
1-201(26)(a), 37 it seems that the wording interpreted in its strict grammatical
sense correctly reflects the intent of the draftsmen."
The second setting in which receipt may occur is, if anything, more
remote from the idea of physical receipt than the first. Subsection (b) of section
1-201(26) does not even require that the recipient become aware of the notifica-
tion, or that he be physically present at the premises where it is delivered. Sub-
section (b) requires delivery of notice, but it would be mistaken to interpret that
term as requiring any transfer of notice in tangible form. While delivery is not
defined in the U.C.C., it is well established that the term does not imply the
physical delivery of written notice. It only requires that steps be taken that may
be reasonably expected to inform in the ordinary course. 39 This is in keeping
with the general approach of the U.C.C., which does not require written notice
quire both the giving and receipt of notification include U.C.C. 55 2-209(5), 2-309(3), 9-112(b),
9-304(3), 9-318(1)(b).
36 This view is expressed in Note, Notice and Good Faith Under Article 3 of the U. C. C., 51
VA. L. REV. 1342, 1345 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Virginia Note]. The notification must in any
event be intelligible and must fulfill the function intended. A purported notification which fails to
do that is not a notification at all, even if it is properly received. In come cases the content of
notification may be specifically governed by a particular section, e.g., U.C.C. SS 2-605, 3-508(3),
6-107, 9-312(3)(b), in which case the specific language, as well as this general principle, must be
complied with. Questions of content, time, and general reasonableness of notification are
peripheral to the present issue and are not dealt with here.
" 1 R. ANDERSON, U.C.C. 115 (2d ed. 1971) suggests that such a literal approach be
avoided.
" Compare U.C.C. 5 2.201(2) with 5 1-201(20). Section 2-201(2) provides not only that
a writing must be received, but also that the party receiving it has reason to know its contents.
Surely one should assume that the draftsmen said what they intended, and that they would not
have fallen prey to so basic a grammatical gaffe.
39 Page v. Camper City & Mobile Homes Sales, 297 So. 2d 810 (Ala. 1974); Smith v.
Butler, 311 A.2d 813 (Md. 1973); International Paper Co. v. Margrove, Inc., 75 Misc. 2d 763,
348 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1973).
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unless it so prescribes it either expressly" or by the use of the word "send. ,,41
Because receipt of notice sufficient for the purposes of sections 1-201(25)
and (26) frequently may amount to something less than the actual communica-
tion of information, section 1-201(25)(b) may properly be viewed as a construc-
tive notice provision. Yet there is a measure of ambiguity in the section. By its
nature, constructive notice is measured by an absolutely objective standard.
No account whatever is taken of the state of mind of the person sought to be
charged. In the case of notification, that standard would be fully met if the
mere dispatch of the notification qualified as notice. Where receipt is required,
however, it is arguable that notification is more closely akin to actual notice in
its wider sense. It could be argued that all section 1-201(25)(b) does is set up a
factual inference that upon receipt of notification the recipient would, if acting
reasonably, become aware of its contents. It is submitted, however, that the
constructive notice interpretation is preferable because notice is irrebuttably
concluded upon the showing of a receipt. As previously noted, the definition of
receipt provided in section 1-201(26) does not require an inquiry into the state
of mind of the recipient, and such an inquiry is essential in making a determi-
nation of actual notice. 42
In addition to constructive notice through notification, there are two other
forms of constructive notice that must be considered. These types of construc-
tive notice are derived from specific provisions of the U.C.C. and are appli-
cable only to certain transactions. First, constructive notice may arise in some
specific cases as a result of a notation on a negotiable instrument, document or
security. Section 3-304(1)(a) charges the purchaser of a negotiable instrument
with notice of various matters which appear from the instrument itself." Simi-
larly, section 8-304 holds the purchaser of a certificated security accountable
for certain specified facts which appear from the security itself." Finally, under
section 7-502(d) the holder of a negotiable document" has absolute notice of
4° See, e.g., U.C.C. 55 2-616, 9-114(1)(b), 9-312(3)(6), 9-505(2).
41 The word "send" is defined in 1-201(38) to require the physical transmission of
written notice. See, e.g., Edmondson v. Air Service, Co., 123 Ga. App. 263, 180 S.E.2d 589
(1971); Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 370 N.E.2d 918 (Ind. 1977); Atlas Constr. Co. v.
Dravo Doyle Co., 3 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 124 (Pa. 1965). Several courts, however, have refused
to penalize a party who failed to send written notice even though the section in question required
that notice be "sent." These courts preferred to weigh all the circumstances surrounding the
notification, and to decide whether, in sum, the steps taken to notify were reasonable. Hall v.
Owen County State Bank, 370 N.E.2d 918 (Ind. 1977); Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Alatzas, 264
Md. 571, 287 A.2d 261 (1972); DeLay First Nat'! Bank & Trust Co. v. Jacobson Appliance Co.,
196 Neb. 398, 243 N.W.2d 745 (1976).
42 There is at least one court that has not placed this interpretation of absolute notice
upon the notification provisions of S 1-201(25)(b). In Exxon Corp. v. Raetzer, 533 S.W.2d 842
(Tex. 1976), the court did not confine itself to the question of whether or not notification was
received by the issuer of a certificated security under 8-.405, but inquired into the content of
such notification and found it to be inadequate to convey notice of the relevant facts, on the basis
of the "reason to know" standard of $ 1-201(25)(c).
" U.C.C. 5 3-304(1)(a) is discussed in text at notes 130-50 infra.
44 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank,
22 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 490, 497 (D. Mass. 1977).
4' Under U.C.C. 5 7-501(4) a holder is one who purchased the document in good faith,
216	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 22:203
any defenses or claims which arise under the terms of the document." In each
of these cases it is the notation of the fact on the writing itself that is relevant,
and the subjective state of mind of the purchaser is of no significance.
Second, the most obvious provision for constructive notice is found in the
recording provisions of article 9. 47 The holder of a security interest in goods
may, by recording his interest in the appropriate public records, charge certain
other persons with notice of that interest irrespective of whether the recording
itself or the facts recorded ever came to their attention." The sole relevant
criterion is whether or not the act of recording was correctly performed, and the
state of mind of the person to be charged is irrelevant."
4. Actual Notice Under the U.C.C.
While constructive notice arises in a narrow area, circumscribed by
specific authorization and presumption of law, actual notice occupies a broad
terrain. Its territory begins with the most obvious form of actual notice, actual
direct knowledge, and it moves through gradations of inference and presump-
tion until it reaches its other extreme, at the very borders of constructive notice.
For the purposes of analysis these gradations can be organized into two broad
categories. 50 The first category is that of actual notice proper. This category in-
cludes situations in which actual notice is shown to have existed by either direct
or circumstantial evidence. The second category comprises situations in which
the evidence falls short of establishing actual knowledge but it establishes cir-
without notice of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person, for value, and in the
regular course of business or financing.
" Concededly, U.C.C. 7-502(1)(d) is more akin to questions of form and contract
liability than to the question of notice. It provides that
a holder to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated acquires
thereby
.. . (d) the direct obligation of the issuer to hold or deliver the goods according
to the terms of the document free of any defense or claim by him except those aris-
ing under the terms of the document or under this Article.
47 See, e.g., U.C.C. $S 9-302, 9-312, 9-313, 9-401, 9-402. No attempt is made here to
list definitively all the sections in article 9 which bear upon perfection by filing.
" Obviously, this is a broad generalization which ignores the complexities of perfection
by filing under article 9. A careful study of that area is well beyond the scope of this article, and is
not attempted.
" The illustrative function of this reference to article 9 necessitates a broad generaliza-
tion. There are, of course, situations in which the state of mind of the person to be charged is rele-
vant to the question of notice. U.C.C. SS 9-307(1), 9-308, 9-312(3) and 9-401(2) serve as ex-
amples of such situations.
" The idea of breaking up actual notice into different categories is not new. Earlier
writers went to great pains to distinguish various degrees of actual knowledge. Thus, Bispham
divided actual notice into implied or presumptive notice on the other. BISPHAM, supra note 1, at
379. A frequently used distinction was that between express notice and implied notice. The ter-
minology varied, see 1 N.Y Law Rev. Comm'n Report, supra note 23, at 269, for a list of the
various terms used, but in essence it boils down to a description of the distinctions between actual
notice arising from direct actual knowledge, and actual notice inferred from circumstances. See
also the analysis by Long, supra note 1, at 144. Merrill, suggested a distinction which is found at
the base of the dichotomy used both in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, see note 41
supra, and U.C.C. — between notice derived from actual knowledge, and that derived from
reason to know. Merrill, supra note 16, at 432.
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cumstances from which such actual knowledge can be imputed to the person to
be charged, not so much as a matter of fact, but as a matter of law. Although it
is normally possible to glean from the facts whether actual notice derives from
evidence or imputation, in some cases the factual setting can be rather ambig-
uous, and it may not be clear whether knowledge has been circumstantially
proven or imputed."
The two categories seek to reach the same results by a different inquiry.
The first attempts to establish actual knowledge through a pure interpretation
of facts. The second concedes that the facts do not establish actual knowledge
but asserts that the facts are sufficient to establish, as a matter of principle, that
actual knowledge would have been obtained had the person acted in a reason-
able manner, and, therefore, it imputes knowledge as a matter of law. If on the
basis of a factual inquiry it is established on the balance of probabilities that ac-
tual knowledge existed, there is no need for an inquiry of the second type.
The first category, involves actual notice in the purest sense. 52 It is at this
point that actual knowledge and notice coincide. The gradations in this first
category, therefore, are more evidentiary than conceptual: In this category,
[t]he existence of actual notice is purely a question of fact, and like
any other fact, notice may be proven either (1) directly, by evidence
bringing the fact of knowledge of the prior claim home to the party,
or (2) indirectly, that is by circumstantial evidence."
Therefore, the distinction here is simply between direct evidence of the
person's state of mind and indirect evidence which establishes that state of
mind by a preponderance of the evidence. 54
 Whether the knowledge is directly
proven or inferred from the circumstances, the end result is a finding that the
person to be charged with knowledge had such knowledge as a matter of fact.
That finding results in the legal conclusion that he had actual notice of the fact
in question.
" E.g. , in Frequency Electronics, Inc. v. National Radio Co., Inc., 20 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. 680, ard on other grounds, 20 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), a holder of a note
was treated as having notice through failure to conduct further inquiries which should reasonably
have been conducted. The facts of the case would equally admit of a holding that on the probabil-
ities, he had actual knowledge.
" Pre-Code writers and U.C.C. § 1-201(25)(a) agree that actual notice is constituted
by a showing of actual knowledge. Long, supra note 1, at 148; Merrill, supra note 16, at 418;
BISPHAM, supra note 1, at 379; POMEROY, supra note 1, at 1111. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Otto
Huber & Sons, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1234 (D. S.D. 1975).
" Long, supra note 1, at 144. Although the words are Long's, the classification here is
not in accord with Long's analysis. He includes under the head of circumstantial evidence
establishing actual notice, situations which would here fall into the second category of actual
notice. It is submitted that the dichotomy based on the question of whether notice is proven or in-
ferred despite lack of proof, better serves to clarify this area.
54 For examples of cases in which the court found, on weighing the evidence, that actual
notice, in the form of actual knowledge existed under § 1-201(25)(a), see HML Investment Co.
v. Siciliano, 103 N.J. Super. 27, 246 A.2d 502 (1968); First State Bank & Trust Co. v. George,
519 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1974). By contrast, circumstantial evidence was not sufficiently strong to
establish knowledge in In re County Green Limited Partnership, 438 F. Supp. 693 (W,D, Va.
1977).
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The distinction between actual notice which is proven and actual notice
which is imputed is that in the case of imputed actual notice there is no factual
finding that the person to be charged had actual knowledge. On the contrary,
the facts tend either to afford no conclusion at all on the person's awareness of
the relevant facts, or to indicate that he was unaware of them. The salient in-
quiry, therefore, becomes whether or not knowledge of such facts may be
ascribed to him in the absence of any clear showing that he was aware of them.
Thus, the first category is concerned only with knowledge subjectively deter-
mined, while the second encompasses knowledge objectively determined.
It is this second genre of actual notice that has so frequently been mis-
named constructive notice." Although, like constructive notice, it involves the
attribution of knowledge not necessarily actually possessed, it differs from con-
structive notice significantly because it is concerned with the state of mind of
the person to be charged.
In pre-Code law the behavior of the person to be charged was measured
against that of the reasonable person. If a reasonable person would have had
knowledge of the fact in question, then such knowledge was imputed to the per-
son to be charged. In general, the imputation arose where there were facts that
reasonably should have stimulated inquiry. The party concerned must have
been presented with the means of acquiring knowledge and with some in-
dication that it would be worthwhile or prudent to use those means. 56 For ex-
ample, notice existed where the evidence indicated that the person was aware
of circumstances that should have led him to the ultimate facts as a matter of
logical inference, or where the facts known should have excited sufficient suspi-
cions to compel him to investigate further. If the person to be charged failed to
draw the appropriate inferences or failed to investigate when it would have
been reasonable for him to do so, he nevertheless is charged with the knowl-
edge that he would have obtained had he acted in the expected way." If he was
" See text at note 20 supra. Long observed:
IT]he means of knowledge are in equity equivalent, not to notice, but to knowledge,
and the party is held to have actual notice because he has the legal equivalent of
knowledge. But it is a serious mistake to call this constructive notice, which under
statutes requiring actual notice, will not suffice unless the term "constructive" is
here used to denote a special kind of actual notice, which, of course, introduces
confusion.
Long, supra note 1, at 147. Long goes on to say that cases in which a person fails to use these
means of knowledge should not be regarded as part of the doctrine of notice at all, but as a kind of
estoppel. Id. at 148. The confusion in terminology finds its way into court opinions even today.
E.g., Security State Bank v. Baty, 439 F.2d 910 (10th Cir. 1971), in which the court apparently
uses the words "constructive notice" where it means "reason to know."
56 See generally Long, supra note 1, at 144-46; 1 N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n Report, supra
note 23, at 270; POMEROY, supra note 1, at 597; Merrill notes:
One who does not know a fact affecting his legal position may nevertheless be
conscious of other facts so strongly indicating the existence of the ultimate fact,
that a man of ordinary prudence would inquire concerning it or conduct his busi-
ness as though it existed.
Merrill, supra note 16, at 419.
" Merrill devotes attention to describing the various situations in which circumstances
have been held to have stimulated inquiry. 1 M. MERRILL ON NOTICE chs. 4-6 (1952). A similar
catalogue is avoided here in favor of a more generalized statement of principle. The rule must of
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spurred to inference or inquiry but unjustifiably failed to reach the conclusion
that a reasonable person would have reached, then similarly his lack of actual
knowledge of the relevant facts would not avail him."
Where actual knowledge was imputed, it was immaterial whether the fail-
ure to acquire actual knowledge was the result of bad faith or negligence."
This fact was significant in the context of bona fide purchasers because it pro-
vided a clear distinction between the requirements of good faith and lack of
notice. As a result of this division, pre-Code notice rules could not be treated
merely as attempts to impose penalties on persons who deliberately avoided in-
formation. The good faith requirement served this function. Instead such rules
had to be the product of efforts to insure that commerce was carried on in a
responsible and diligent fashion.
Section 1-201(25)(c) is an heir to these standards. It imputes notice of a
fact to one who had reason to know of that fact. The phrase "reason to know"
comes from section 9 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency. 6° The commen-
tary to section 9 shows that the test in the Restatement for determining when a
person has reason to know is closely related to the test for imputed actual
knowledge in pre-Code law. 6 ' While this test has been described as an objective
necessity be a generalized one, as it is not possible to lay down any rigid guidelines on which cir-
cumstances should trigger inquiry. The facts of each case must be looked at. See also STORY, supra
note 3, at 389.
58
 Long, supra note 1, at 146.
59
 At this point it is probably worthwhile once again to recognize that both in pre-Code
law and under the U.C.C. the requirements of good faith and notice are separate and distinct,
and must both be satisfied according to their independent criteria. The fact that the same circum-
stances may go to satisfying both sets of criteria does not alter that principle. See, e.g., Branch
Banking & Trust v. Gill, 293 N.C. 164, 237 S.E.2d 21 (1977). POMEROY, supra note 1, at 596-
87. Pomeroy's text has to be considered cautiously in that it adopts an approach to the distinction
between actual and constructive notice which is entirely different from that adopted herein. See
text at note 22 supra.
6°
 The text of 5 9 is set out in note 25 supra.
61
 Comment (d) to 5 9 states:
A person has reason to know of a fact if he has information from which a per-
son of ordinary intelligence, or of the superior intelligence which such person may
have, would infer that the fact in question exists or that there is such a substantial
chance of its existence that, if exercising reasonable care with reference to the mat-
ter in question, his action would be predicated upon assumption of its possible ex-
istence. The inference drawn need not be that the fact exists; it is sufficient that the
likelihood of its existence is so great that a person of ordinary intelligence, or of the
superior intelligence which the person in question has, would, if exercising or-
dinary prudence under the circumstances, govern his conduct as if the fact existed,
until he could ascertain its existence or non-existence. The words "reason to
know" do not necessarily import the existence of a duty to others to ascertain facts;
the words are used both where the actor has a duty to another and where he would
not be acting adequately in the protection of his own interests were he not to act
with reference to the facts which he has reason to know. One may have reason to
know a fact although he does not make the inference of its existence which would
be made by a reasonable person in his position and with his knowledge, whether
his failure to make such inference is due to inferior intelligence or to a failure prop-
erly to exercise such intelligence as he has. A person of superior intelligence or
training has reason to know a fact if a person with his mental capacity and attain-
ments would draw such an inference from the facts known to him. On the other
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one, the description is not entirely accurate because the test contains both an
objective and a subjective element. In the first instance it requires a subjective
inquiry in order to establish that the person had actual knowledge of certain
secondary facts. This involves an inquiry into the state of mind of the person
concerned. It is an inquiry that is not satisfied merely by showing that a reason-
able person would have known the secondary facts. The party himself must
have known them. Nevertheless, once the subjective baseline is established
either directly or circumstantially, 62 the court is able to apply an objective test
and to inquire how a reasonable person" would have responded to the second-
ary facts."
The precise scope of the party's duty to inquire is clearly established under
the U.C.C., as it was in pre-Code law. There is no general duty of inquiry im-
posed in all cases, nor is there any obligation on a person to treat every trans-
action with the greatest of suspicion, irrespective of whether or not any danger
signals are present. Furthermore, even if danger signals do appear, the courts
have tended to look at them carefully, trying to establish just what should be
the reasonable reaction to those signals. 65 Facts that are equivocal or am-
biguous may not be strong enough to stimulate the type of investigation needed
to unearth, or to direct the transferee's attention to, the true state of affairs.
hand, "reason to know" imports no duty to ascertain facts not to be deduced as in-
ferences from facts already known; one has reason to know a fact only if a reason-
able person in his position would infer such fact from other facts already known to
him . . . .
Id.
62 On the question of evidence required, the same principles apply as will apply in the
case of proving direct knowledge of ultimate facts.
63 In determining the subjective baseline, account must be taken, not only of the knowl-
edge of the party, but also of the particular attributes of the party which bear upon his apprecia-
tion of the knowledge. Thus, in Weller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 290 A.2d 842 (Del. 1972),
the court, in deciding whether the plaintiff had notified the issuer of a stock certificate of a forgery
within a reasonable time of her having notice of it under 5 8-405(1), took into account the age and
ill health of the plaintiff and her trust in the forger.
64
 Virginia Note, supra note 36, at 1347; Note, Holders in Due Course, The Requirements of
Good Faith and Notice, 28 MD. L. REV. 145, 153 (1968). Further support may be found for this
view in the official comments to 5 3-304 in the 1949 Official Draft of the U.C.C. At that time
notice was defined in article 3. The purchaser of an investment was charged with notice if, inter
alia, he had, upon all the facts and circumstances known to him, reasonable grounds to believe
that there was an infirmity in the instrument. The section is considered more fully below. For the
present purposes the official comments to the section are helpful insofar as they address the
meaning of the words all the facts and circumstances known to the purchaser." Id. The com-
ment states that those words are intended to mean that "the purchaser may act upon the ag-
gregate of what he knows where a reasonable man in his position would do so." Id. See also
Cleveland v. McNabb, 312 F, Supp. 155 (W.D. Tenn. 1970); Ibanez v. Farmers Underwriters
Ass'n, 14 Cal. 3d 390, 534 P.2d 1336, 121 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1975); Suit & Wells Equipment Co. v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank, 282 A.2d 109 (Md. 1971).
63 Slaughter v. Jefferson Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 19 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 171, 179
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. New England Merchants Nat'l
Bank, 22 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 490 (D. Mass. 1977); Salter v. Vanotti, 26 U.C.C. REP SERV.
964 (Colo. 1979); Eldon's Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, 207 N.W. 2d 282 (Minn.
1973); Exxon Corp. v. Raetzer, 533 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1976). But cf. Hollywood Nat'l Bank v.
I.B.M. Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 607, 113 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1974) (The court applied the subjective-
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Further, the transferee is not required to brood or speculate but must be alert
only to those facts that compel attention. 66
 In addition, there is a requirement
that some rational and discernible nexus exists between what is known to the
transferee and what is inferred from that knowledge. The link must be one that
would be expected to be made rather readily. 67
A few illustrations of the way in which courts have linked primary infor-
mation to notice of ultimate facts seems to demonstrate that the approach to the
"reason to know" standard has been a careful, fact-oriented one. For example,
as a general rule, a transferee of property will not be held to have reason to
know of a third-party interest in property transferred merely because he knew
that the property was involved in a relationship or underlying transaction be-
tween his transferor and a third party. This remains true even if the transferee
knew that his transferor had not completed performance in the underlying
transaction." In order for him to be charged with notice of a claim or defense
relating to the property, the transferee must have had more information. He
must have had an indication that something had gone sour in the underlying
transaction that might compromise his transferor's right to the property in
question. 69
Similarly, the majority view is that knowledge of a transferor's parlous
financial circumstances will not of itself give a transferee reason to know that
there is something amiss in the transaction. Such knowledge is too generalized
to act as a warning in a specific contractual setting." A stronger warning signal
ly oriented approach normally associated with the inquiry into a purchaser's good faith. In so do-
ing the court misconstrued the standards set out by 5 1-201 and confused the requirements of
good faith and notice.). A similar commingling of the good faith and the notice standards ap-
parently occurred in Jeanette's Frocks, Inc. v. First Produce State Bank, 137 N.W.2d 205
(Minn. 1965), and in Colin v. Central Pennsylvania Nat'l Bank, 18 U.C.C. REP. BERN. 188
(E. D. Pa. 1975).
66 Exxon Corp. v. Raetzer, 533 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1976).
67 Sometimes the language used by courts interpreting the provisions of 1-201(25) of
the U.C.C. is remarkably reminiscent of that employed by courts dealing with the subjective
standard of 5 56 of the N.I.L. See text at notes 108-13 infra. Doubtless, some courts have con-
tinued to be influenced, albeit unconsciously, by the subjective standard. An indication of this in-
fluence appears from the regularity with which courts unquestionably cite pre-Code cases when
interpreting 5 1-201(25)(c). See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Raetzer, 533 S.W.2d 842, 846-48 (Tex.
1976).
69 Jaeger & Branch, Inc. v. Pappas, 20 Utah 2d 100, 443 P.2d 605 (1967). In the area
of negotiable instruments this concept finds expression in the provisions of 5 3-304(4), set out in
note 115 infra, which differentiate knowledge of such underlying data from facts that properly can
be described as danger signals. See Stewart v. Thornton, 116 Ariz. 107, 568 P.2d 414 (1977);
Leninger v. Anderson, 255 N.W.2d 22, 28 (Minn. 1977); Commerce Trust Co. v. Denson, 437
S.W.2d 94, 96 (Mo. 1968); Cheltenham Nat'l Bank v. Snelling, 326 A.2d 557, 560 (Pa. 1974).
69 See, e.g., Salter v. Vanotti, 26 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 964 (Colo. 1979) (danger signals
were present in the terms of an executory contract); Davenport v. Unicapital Corp., 230 S.E.2d
905 (S.C. 1976) (mere provision of usurious interest in an accompanying contract was held to
place the holder of an instrument on notice of a defense).
7° In the area of negotiable instruments, banks have been held not to be on notice of a
defense to an instrument negotiated by a customer merely because they were aware of the
customer's financial instability. Texico State Bank v. Hullinger, 75 Ill. App. 2d 212, 220 N.E.2d
248 (1966). Cf. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Fort Lee Say. & Loan Ass'n, 89 N.J. Super. 43, 213 A.2d
315 (1965) (reaching the same conclusion based on a test of good faith). Bowling Green, Inc. v.
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is needed." Even knowledge that the transferee is bankrupt and that the trans-
fer might be voidable as a preference in bankruptcy will not of itself constitute
notice of a superior claim to the property. 72
 Further, in cases where property is
acquired at a bargain price or at a substantial discount, notice is not generally
provided unless the price is so absurdly low that a conclusion of illicit dealing is
irresistible." There are surely some factors that will act as stronger indicia that
there is something unwholesome in the transaction, yet even in such cases, one
would be hard-pressed to suggest that an absolute presumption of notice arises.
In each case the totality of the circumstances must be examined and the link
established
A final illustration of the general principle enunciated here is afforded by
those cases where the transferee and transferor have an intimate relationship.
In such cases, it is sometimes argued that the relationship should compel a
finding that the transferee had notice of any defense arising out of a transaction
between the transferor and a third party. This argument achieved prominence
in cases where a consumer gave a negotiable instrument to a retailer in ex-
change for goods. The seller then negotiated the instrument to a third party
that claimed to be a holder in due course. Where the seller and the holder had a
close relationship in which the holder dealt frequently with the seller and exer-
cised a measure of control over its credit operations, it was sometimes held that
the holder could not be a holder in due course. Because of its close connection
with the seller, the holder was treated as a party to the original transaction. In
Unico v. Owen," a pre-Code case, the court based its rationale not on the notice
provision of the U.C.C., but on the theory that the holder must, by virtue of its
State Street Bank & Trust Co,, 307 F. Supp. 648 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 81 (1st Cir.
1970); Commerce Bank v. Edco Financial Serv., 379 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Mo. 1974);
Bierschwale v, Oakes, 497 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. 1973).
7 ' For an example of a case in which such stronger signals accompanied knowledge of
the debtor's financial difficulties, see Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apts., 20 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. 1269 (Minn. 1977). Conversely, signals were held not to be strong enough in Nicklaus v,
Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 258 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Ark. 1965), aff'd, 369 F.2d 683 (8th Cir.
1966).
72 I n the case of negotiable instruments there is clear authority that notice of a claim to
the instrument will not be derived from the mere fact that the holder knew that the transferee of
the instrument was bankrupt, or that the transfer was a voidable preference under bankruptcy
law. This authority emerges from the drafting history of ,§ 3-304. See text at note 160 infra. It
would seem that the rationale behind the rule in the case of negotiable instruments would apply
equally to other forms of property.
73 Miriani v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1011 (D. Ill. 1973); Stewart v.
Thornton, 116 Ariz. 107, 568 P.2d 414 (1977); Hopkins v. Kemp Motor Sales, 139 Ga. App.
471, 228 S.E.2d 607 (1976).
" Even where a person habitually cashed checks payable to others, that in itself was in-
sufficient to establish that the bank had reason to know that the person had acquired the checks il-
licitly. Jeanette Frocks, Inc. v. First Produce State Bank, 137 N.W.2d 205 (Minn. 1965).
72
 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967). Unico was based on prior case authority, which is
cited in the opinion, and also in Jones v. Approved Bancredit, 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969). See also
Mann v. Leasko, 179 Cal. App. 2d 692, 4 Cal. Rptr, 124 (1960). A discussion of authority extant
prior to Unico v. Owen can be found in Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure
of the Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 48, 60-77 (1966).
January 1981]	 NOTICE UNDER THE U.C. C. 	 223
involvement in the affairs of the seller, be treated as a participant in the original
sale.
Many cases decided under the U.C.C. have followed Unico v. Owen. Some
have based their decisions on the same grounds," but other courts reached
equivalent results based on different theories. Some courts have based their
decisions on a finding that the holder knew enough about the original trans-
action to call into question its good faith in taking the instrument." Other
courts have reasoned that the relationship between the holder and the seller put
the holder on notice of defenses arising out of the original transaction."
In this last group of cases, when considering the relationship between
holder and seller in the light of the U.C.C.'s notice provision, the courts have
not imposed any absolute standard, but have looked at all the circumstances,
including that relationship and course of dealing, in order to decide whether
the holder had reason to know of the defense."
Where the court undertakes such a factual inquiry, to determine whether
a person had reason to know a particular fact, the object is to determine the
person's state of mind by a substantially objective standard. Consequently,
where a person is found to have reason to know a fact, he may be deemed to
have actual notice of it. This form of actual notice is often confused with con-
structive notice because the actual knowledge of the person is immaterial. It is
distinguished from constructive notice, however, because there is no set of cir-
cumstances that will give rise to an irrebuttable presumption of notice.
C. Special Problems of Notice
1. Forgotten Notice
A possible exception to the general principles of actual and constructive
notice is the doctrine of forgotten notice. Both under pre-Code law and under
the U.C.C., the essential time for measuring the absence or presence of notice
is the time that the rights in question were acquired. Certainly, notice acquired
after that time cannot be relevant. 8°
76 See, e.g., Jones v. ApprovedBancredit, 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969).
" U.S. Finance v. Jones, 229 So. 2d 495 (Ma. 1969); American Plan Corp. v. Woods,
16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 240 N.E.2d 886 (1968) (this case was decided on good faith principles, but
relied on the Unico v. Owen rationale too); Norman v. World Wide Distributors, Inc., 202 Pa.
Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963).
79 See cases cited at note 79 infra. See also HART & W1LLIER, COMMERCIAL. PAPER
UNDER THE U.C.C., 2 BENDER U.C.C. SERVICE 11.07(2).
79
 Waterbury Say. Bank v. Jaroszewski, 4 Conn. Cir. 620, 238 A.2d 446 (1967);
Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams, 244 A.2d (D.C. 1968) (the U.C.C. is not cited); Kaw Valley
State Bank & Trust Co. v. Riddle, 549 P.2d 927 (Kan. 1976).
" A general principle, which filters throughout the U.C.C., is that notice must be
received in a way and at a time that will enable the person notified to act effectively in the light of
the information received. E.g., Comment 8, to 5 2-706; 5 3-304(6); Comment 5 to 5 9-504.
Clearly there is no justification for attributing notice to a person retrospectively. See also McCook
County Nat'l Bank v. Compton, 558 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1977); Slaughter v. Jefferson Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 19 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 171 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Third Nat'l Bank v. Hardi
Gardens Supply, 380 F. Supp. 930 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v.
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There has long been confusion, however, on the question of whether or
not notice acquired prior to the crucial date but subsequently forgotten will be
attributable to a person at the crucial date." The general principle under pre-
Code law was that actual notice would be ascribed to a person either where it
exists in fact or where, under the circumstances, the person had reason to know
of the facts in question. The Restatement (Second) of Agency treats the case of
forgotten notice in the light of that general principle," and a reading of all but
the last sentence of section 1-201(25) could lead to the conclusion that the
U.C.C. deals with forgotten notice in the same way. If the evidence established
that knowledge once had was not forgotten, despite the protestations to the
contrary by the party to be charged, then section 1-201(25)(a) applies because
it would have been shown that the party had actual knowledge of the relevant
fact at the crucial time. If a person did not have actual knowledge of the rele-
vant facts at the crucial time but such knowledge at a prior time, then the
"reason to know" standard of section 1-201(25)(c) would apply. If it could be
established that the circumstances of the transaction as a whole were such that
it was not reasonable for him to have forgotten the information, actual notice
would exist.
Unfortunately, the draftsmen were unwilling to allow the language of the
section to stand on its own and they incorporated the final sentence in section
1-201(25) which declares that "[t]he time and circumstances under which a
notice or notification may cease to be effective are not determined by this
act."" In the only substantive comment to the section the draftsmen explain
Murphy, 369 F. Supp. 11, 13 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Bowling Green, Inc. v. State Street Bank &
Trust Co., 307 F. Supp. 648 (D. Mass. 1969); Waterbury Say. Bank v. Jaroszewski, 4 Conn.
Cir. 620, 238 A.2d 446 (1967).
81 In commenting upon this confusion Merrill suggested that it was possible and desir-
able to set up rather clear rules to determine those cases in which notice once received may be
forgotten and those cases in which notice once received may be considered unforgettable. He
argued that in some cases forgetfulness would be excusable but in others notice should be treated
as always being present from the time of its receipt onward, or at least until it could be reasonably
regarded as no longer relevant. He set out five categories in which notice could properly be
treated as unforgettable, and in so doing attempted to analyze the diverse treatment of forgotten
notice in pre-Code law. In essence, his theory appears to be nothing more than a long-winded
statement of the general principle of pre-Code law that actual notice will be ascribed to a person
either where it exists in fact or where, under the circumstances, the person had reason to know of
the facts in question. M. MERRILL ON NOTICE 443, 455 (1952); Merrill, Unforgettable Knowledge,
34 MICH. L. REV 474, 486 (1936).
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 5 9(1), set out fully in note 25 supra, prescribes
the general test. Comment (d) speaks of forgotten notice as follows:
Further, a person has reason to know facts only if the circumstances are such that
any unconscious knowledge would be made conscious if such person were to meet
the required standards with reference to memory, consideration for the interests of
others, or, in some instances, consideration for one's own interests. Thus, one
who had no reason to remember facts once known would not at a later time have
reason to know the facts.
83 U.C.C. 5 1-201(25). Apparently the wording was added in 1957 to appease New
York banking interests. See Penney, New York Revisits the Code: Some Variations in the New York
Enactment of the U.C.C., 62 COLUM. L. REV. 992, 998-99 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Penny];
Braucher, U. C. C. Article 3 — Commercial Paper — New York Variations, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 57,
66-67 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Braucher].
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these words by saying "the last sentence [of] the act leaves open the time and
circumstance under which notice or notification may cease to be effective.
Therefore such cases as Graham v. White Phillips Co. ... are not over-
ruled. "84 By the addition of the last sentence in the section and the comment
the drafters of the Code have tended to confuse an area that was quite capable
of being dealt with under the general principles of notice set out in the earlier
part of the section. It seems that the draftsmen did not wish to disturb the doc-
trine of forgotten notice as it had developed in the cases. The difficulty is,
however, that there had been no doctrine of forgotten notice that had acquired
general recognition. More important, even if such a general doctrine did exist,
Graham v. White Phillips Co." did not pretend to enunciate it.
In Graham v. White Phillips Co. the United States Supreme Court had to
decide whether or not White Phillips Company, the purchaser of stolen negoti-
able coupons, should prevail over the original owner of the bonds. 86 In order to
decide the question, the Court had to determine whether White Phillips was a
holder in due course of the bonds as defined in sections 52 and 56 of the Negoti-
able Instruments Law (N.I.L.)." This issue turned on the question whether or
not White Phillips had either actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect in the
instrument or knowledge of such facts that its action in taking the instrument
amounted to bad faith. 88 The evidence showed that notice of the theft was re-
ceived by the company, but that it failed to take adequate steps to disseminate
the contents of the notice to its officers. As a result of the faulty communica-
tion, the appropriate officers had no actual knowledge of the theft at the time
that the bonds were purchased. It was an accepted factual basis of the opinion
that the company's action was negligent.
The Court held a person may still be a good faith purchaser even though
he has negligently forgotten notice once received." The test to be applied is one
of simply honesty. Although the existence of notice may go to establish a lack of
honesty, the purchaser may, by showing that the notice was forgotten, rebut
any presumption of knowledge, and hence of dishonest conduct.
The Court in enunciating the above principle clearly was confining itself
to cases involving bona fide purchasers of negotiable instruments under the
provisions of the N.I.L. and under the common law relating to negotiable
instruments that existed prior to the enactment of that statute. These principles
varied from those applied in other areas." In the case of negotiable instruments
the test was a purely subjective, "good faith" one. In cases outside of the law of
negotiable instruments, the courts recognized that the presence or absence of
notice could be determined objectively, 91 and that negligence was a relevant
consideration.
84 U.C.C.	 1-201(25), Comment 1 (citations omitted).
85 296 U.S. 27 (1935).
86 Id. at 28.
87 Id. at 29.
88 This is the test prescribed by 56 of the N.I.L. for determining whether or not a pur-
chaser of an instrument had notice. It is discussed more fully at notes 102-13 infra.
89 296 U.S. at 32.
9° See text at notes 102.13 infra.
91 See text at notes 59-61 supra.
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Section 1-201(25)(c) likewise provides for an objective assessment of
notice. In that light, the doctrine of forgotten notice as set out in Graham v.
White Phillips Co. is entirely inapposite. It is not defensible in its present general
setting, nor is it valid any more even in the case of negotiable instruments."
Even under the N.I.L. it was only a minority rule. 93 Consequently, the
reference to the Graham v. White Phillips Co. and the disclaimer concerning the
doctrine of forgotten notice is baffling. It can only lead to misinterpretations of
section 1-201(25) and a resulting dilution of the "reason to know" standard
that is there set out." Fortunately, there are cases decided since the enactment
of the U.C.C. in which the doctrine of forgotten notice has been treated with a
healthy degree of skepticism."
The conclusion that must be reached is that a doctrine of forgotten notice
is incompatible with the treatment of notice under the U.C.C. Each case in
which notice has been forgotten must be determined on the general standard by
taking account of the circumstances generally and deciding whether or not it
was reasonable in the light of those circumstances for the purchaser to have
forgotten the notice.
" See text and notes at notes 118-19 infra.
93 See W. 13RITToN, BILLS & NOTES 269-71 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as BRIT-
TON]; Merrill, The Wages of Indifference, 10 TEMPLE L.Q. 147 (1935), points out that the rule in
Graham v. White Phillips, based as it was on the law of Michigan and Illinois, represented the law
of a minority of states. It did not represent the majority view in pre-Code law, which tended,
even in the case of negotiable instruments, to bind a purchaser to notice received and forgotten.
See First Nat'l Bank v. Fazzari, 10 N.Y.2d 394, 179 N.E.2d 493, 223 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1961). This
case has been the subject of many commentaries. See, e.g., Comment, 26 ALB. L. REV. 344
(1962); Note, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 670 (1962).
" The troubling effect of the language is illustrated by McCook County Nat'l Bank v.
Compton, 558 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1977). The court found a lack of notice on the simple basis that
the holder of an instrument, even if it received notice, could reasonably have forgotten it under
the circumstances. On the facts, the finding is perfectly compatible with the objective test set out
in S 1-201(25)(c). However, the remarks by the court in relation to the forgotten notice doctrine
illustrate the import of the final sentence of 5 1-201(25) and its potentially damaging effect on the
viability of the objective test both in the case of negotiable instruments and generally. After tying
the forgotten notice doctrine to the subjective good faith standard as enunciated in Graham v.
White Phillips Co., the court remarks that "[the forgotten notice] doctrine is still vital [as] is
evidenced by the commentary to the corresponding U.C.C. provision S 1-201(25) which states
that by leaving open the time or circumstances under which notice or notification ceased to be ef-
fective, cases such as Graham v. White Phillips Co. , supra are not overruled." Id. at 875.
95 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Third Nat'l Bank, 529 F.2d 1141, 1144 (1st
Cir. 1976), involved a purchase by a bank of U.S. Treasury bills which had been stolen. Notice
of the theft had been given to the bank but had not filtered through to the appropriate officers
because the bank failed to exercise due diligence in disseminating the information. The question
was whether the bank qualified as a bona fide purchaser without notice under 5 8-302. The bank
argued for the application of a subjective test based on the final sentence of S 1-201(25) and the
reference to Graham v. White Phillips in the official comment to the section. The court rejected the
bank's argument:
We note that Third Bank has cited no case that suggests that Massachusetts
has ever followed the doctrine of notice forgotten in good faith, much less that it
will follow it now that Massachusetts has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code.
Although there may be circumstances in which Massachusetts would hold that a
notification had ceased to be effective, we do not believe, in view of the objective
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2. Notice to an Organization
In substance, the doctrine of notice applies equally to individuals and
organizations. Where an organization is involved it becomes necessary, how-
ever, to determine when notice received by a representative of an organization
becomes binding on the organization itself. Sections 1-201(27) 96
 and (28)97 are
designed to deal with that question. The sections apply equally to cases of
notice, knowledge, and notification, and deal with all forms of notice provided
for in 1-201(25). Of course, facts derived from constructive notice and ultimate
facts derived from reason to know need not be brought to anyone's attention.
Therefore, notwithstanding its first sentence, section 1-201(27) is only relevant
to situations in which the issue of actual knowledge is at stake. The section thus
applies in order to attribute to the organization actual knowledge of ultimate
facts and also actual knowledge of base facts that ground a reason to know.
Under 1-201(27), in order for an organization to have notice it is necessary
to show that the person conducting or involved in the transaction in question
had notice of the facts." The time from which he will have such notice is the
time at which the facts come to his attention. The section prescribes an objec-
tive test for establishing when such notice is brought to the attention of the in-
dividual concerned. Under this test, notice will be deemed to have been
brought to an individual's attention either when it is in fact brought to his at-
tention or when it should have been brought to his attention if the organization
had exercised proper diligence. 99
 This test engrafts a further layer onto the
criteria of 5 1-201(25), (27) . . . that Massachusetts will adopt a purely subjective
test to determine the continued effectiveness of a notification to an organization.
Id. at 1144. See also Garner v. First Nat'l City Bank, 465 F. Supp. 372, 383 n.17 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
96 U.C.C. 5 1-201(27) provides:
Notice, knowledge or a notice or notification received by an organization is
effective for a particular transaction from the time when it is brought to the atten-
tion of the individual conducting that transaction, and in any event from the time
when it would have been brought to his attention if the organization had exercised
due diligence. An organization exercises due diligence if it maintains reasonable
routines for communicating significant information to the person conducting the
transaction and there is reasonable compliance with the routines. Due diligence
does not require an individual acting for the organization to communicate infor-
mation unless such communication is part of his regular duties or unless he has
reason to know of the transaction and that the transaction would be materially af-
fected by the information.
U.C.C. 1-210(28) defines what is meant by an organization;
"Organization" includes a corporation, government or governmental sub-
division or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or association, two or
more persons having a joint or common interest, or any other legal or commercial
entity.
98 In Mid Continent Nat'l Bank v. Bank of Independence, 532 S.W.2d 569 (Mo.
1975), knowledge of an employee of a bank relating to a fraud was attributed to the bank. Note,
however, it is only knowledge of appropriate employees with proper capacity that is chargeable to
the organization. Bank of Salt Lake v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints, 534 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975); Millman v. State Nat'l Bank of Md., 323 A.2d 723
(D.C. 1974).
99 In Transamerica Ins. Co. v. United States Nat'l Bank, 276 Or. 945, 558 P.2d 328
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objective-subjective inquiry that must be conducted under section 1-201(25).
For example, normally in an inquiry aimed at establishing whether or not an
individual had reason to know a fact, it must first be decided subjectively that
he had notice of base facts and then objectively that he had reason to know the
ultimate fact. If the person in question is not an individual but an organization
represented by its officer, then the first inquiry regarding notice of base facts
will be answered affirmatively not only if he had subjective knowledge of the
base facts, but also if those facts were available to the organization and would
have been brought to his attention had the organization exercised due dili-
gence.
The determination of this last issue turns upon the reasonableness of an
organization's routines for communicating information, and its proper compli-
ance with those routines."° This test is once again a mixture of objective as
well as subjective criteria."' The word "routines" connotes that there must be
established patterns of conduct. Therefore, an organization that has not estab-
lished objectively reasonable patterns of conduct apparently will not be treated
as diligent even if on a particular occasion diligent effort was made to com-
municate a notice to the person dealing with the matter.
Although the issue of notice to an organization complicates the inquiry,
the basic doctrine remains unaltered. Just as in the case of an individual, the
question is whether the person or persons completing the transaction knew or
reasonably should have known of any adverse claims. Furthermore, the answer
is arrived at in the same manner. Actual notice may be established by showing
actual knowledge of the ultimate facts, or by showing awareness of secondary
facts that reasonably impute knowledge of the ultimate facts. Similarly, con-
structive notice may be applied to an organization in any situation where it
may be used against an individual.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF NOTICE AS IT RELATES TO NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
A. Good Faith and Notice in Pre-Code Law: The Origins of Sections 3-302 and 3-304
Traditionally, questions of notice in relation to negotiable instruments
have been dealt with somewhat differently from questions of notice in other
areas. Under the U.C.C. the approach has become more unified, but the tradi-
tional separation has not been laid firmly to rest. Besides the general definitions
of notice in article 1, article 3 has its own specific provisions which bear upon
the questions of notice insofar as it relates to the status of holder in due course
of a negotiable instrument. The sections in question are section 3-302, which
sets out the requirements that have to be met before a holder can qualify as a
holder in due course, and section 3-304, which deals in detail with issues of
(1976), the court directed that evidence to establish what information bank employees possessed
should be limited to that which the jury could reasonably find would have come to their attention
had the bank exercised due diligence.
'°° This test of due diligence was only added in 1962.
'°' Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Third Nat'l Bank of Hampden Co., 529 F.2d 1141 (1st
Cir. 1976); Appeals of Reeves Sound Craft Corp., 2 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 210, 223 (A.S.B.C.A.
1964); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Patchogue Truck & Euipment Co., 5 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1272
(N.Y. 1969).
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notice in the case of negotiable instruments. Before examining these sections,
however, it is necessary to take a brief look at the law as it existed prior to the
enactment of the U.C.C., and to recognize that the clear distinction between
notice and good faith as it exists in the U.C.C. was not always as well defined.
The term "holder in due course" is recognized today as a label describing
the possessor of certain rights in a negotiable instrument. Because a holder in
due course is a bona fide purchaser of the instrument, he takes it free of any
equities that might have attached to it. ' 1) 2 As the phrase suggests, at common
law the status of holder in due course could be attained only by one who ac-
quired an instrument in the due course of his business. This meant not only
that the holder had to be involved in a trade where negotiable instruments were
customarily employed as a medium of exchange, ''" 3
 but also that the acquisition
had to occur in the due, or regular, course of that trade. Due course taking in-
volved both good faith, measured subjeCtively, and reasonable conduct,
measured objectively in the context of the prevailing standards of the trade.'"
Thus, a holder who failed to ascertain facts that would have been exposed by a
diligent investigation would not be viewed as fulfilling the requirements of tak-
ing in the due course of trade.
This objective aspect fell into disuse by the early nineteenth century leav-
ing only the purely subjective test. It was briefly revitalized, however, in the
case of Gill v. Cubitt'° 5 in which the King's Bench held that the failure to investi-
gate circumstances that would have excited the suspicions of a prudent man
was equivalent to bad faith. Gill v. Cubits, therefore, proposed not only a sub-
jective inquiry into a purchaser's state of mind in order to establish his good
faith, but also an inquiry into his behavior based on an external standard. The
objective standard, however, was rejected again a few years later in Goodman v.
Harvey,'" which measured the purchaser's good faith only on the basis of his
factual honesty. Under Harvey, if he had actual knowledge of defenses or claims
relating to the instrument, he would not satisfy the requirement of good faith.
The absence or presence of such knowledge could not be imputed to him on the
basis of a standard of behavior objectively determined.
A similar subjective test of good faith was applied in the United States in
Goodman v. Simonds,'° 7 which formed part of American law up to the time that
'" The rights of a holder in due course are described generally in U.C.C. $ 3-305.
1 " Cf. U.C.C. 5 7-501(4) (the status of holder of a negotiable document is open only to
those who are regularly in the business of acquiring such paper). .
'°4
 Rightmire, The Doctrine of Bad Faith in the Law of Negotiable Paper, 18 MICH. L. REV.
355, 356-57 (1920) [hereinafter cited as Rightmire]; K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION 410-19 (1960) [hereinafter cited as LLEWELLYN].
los 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (K.B. 1824). The case and its context are commented upon, inter
alia, in Rightmire, supra note 104; Palmer, Negotiable Instruments under the U. C. C., 48 MICH. L.
REv. 225, 279 [hereinafter cited as Palmer]; Fagan, Commercial Bad Faith in the Law of Negotiable
Instruments, 25 FORDHAM L. REV. 449, 460 (1956); Penney, supra note 83; BRITTON, supra note
93, at 244. See Van Horn v. Van De Wol, Inc., 6 Wash. App. 959, 497 P.2d 252 (1972); In-
dustrial Nat'l Bank v. Leo's Used Car Exch., Inc., 291 N.E.2d 603 (Mass. 1973).
1 " 111 Eng. Rep. 1011 (1836). See also commentaries cited in notes 104 & 105 supra for
an analysis and commentary upon that case.
107 61 U.S. 343 (1857). See commentaries cited in note 105 supra. Set also Re, Negotiable
Instruments, 26 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 26, 55 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Re]; Comment, 30 N.C. L.
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the N.I.L. was drafted. Under the Simonds approach, as long as there was no
actual knowledge of some claim or defense, and as long as the acquisition was
concluded honestly, there was no imputation of notice to the holder based on
an expectation of reasonable diligence. In this respect a bona fide purchaser of
a negotiable instrument was held to a lesser degree of circumspection than a
bona fide purchaser of other property.
Subsequently, the N.I.L. codified the common law approach, treating the
absence or presence of notice as an aspect of the inquiry into the good faith of
the purchaser of the instrument.'" Thus, notice of an infirmity in an instru-
ment would be constituted only by knowledge of such facts that would make
the taking of the instrument tantamount to an act of bad faith.'° 3 Accordingly,
the general rule under the N.I.L. was that the holder would be charged only
with notice of facts beyond those appearing on the instrument only where he
actually knew such facts or where, in circumstances falling short of actual
knowledge, he failed so grossly to make an inference or an inquiry as to lead to
the conclusion that he deliberately and dishonestly had turned away from
knowledge."° Neither mere suspicion"' nor negligence would be a bar to
holder in due course status. Nevertheless, the unequivocal subjective standard
was not applied universally or consistently during the currency of the N.I.L.
Although the majority of courts applied the subjective test, many courts groped
for an objective standard under the N.I.L. and reached out for such a standard
wherever possible. 12 The resultant confusion persisted up to the enactment of
the U.C.C. and, in fact, continued in cases decided under the Code." 3
The drafters of the U.C.C. followed the dominant themes of the common
law and the N.I.L., but they attempted to resolve the chaos that had attended
the development of the doctrine of notice to holders in due course. Sections
REV. 395, 397 (1952); Note, Notice of Defects in Negotiable Instruments, 38 HARV. L. REV. 321
(1923) [hereinafter cited as Flrvard Note]; Note, Holders in Due Course, The Requirements of Good
Faith and Notice, 28 MD. L. REV. 145, 150 (1966); Note, Relation Between Bad Faith and Notice Under
the NIL., 81 U. PA. L. REV. 617 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Pennsylvania Note]; N.Y. Law
Rev. Comm'n Report, supra note 23, at 205 (1954).
soe Rightmire, supra note 104, at 364; Pennsylvania Note, supra note 107, at 619.
'°9 Section 52(4) of the N.I.L. required that in order to be a holder in due course of an
instrument, a holder must take it without "notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in
the title of the,person negotiating it." That phrase is expanded upon in S 56 which states:
To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of
the person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is negotiated must have
had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that his
action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith.
10 See commentaries cited in note 105 supra. Further case citations are collected in
BEUTEL'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 722 (7th ed. 1948).
1 " Obviously where suspicious circumstances exist the line between a negligent failure
to heed them and a deliberate or studied disregard of them may be a difficult one to draw. A case
decided under the U.C.C. serves as an example. In Norman v. World Wide Distributors, Inc.,
202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963), the court treated a disregard of suspicious circumstances
as a deviance from the good faith standard of S 3-302, rather than on the basis of notice.
"2 Palmer, supra note 105, at 280; Fagan, supra note 105, at 463-65; Virginia Note, supra
note 36, at 1343-44; Harvard Note, supra note 107, at 321; Pennsylvania Note, supra note 107, at
620.
'" See notes 117 & 127 infra.
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3-302(1)" 4 and 3-304115 are the successors to N.I.L. sections 52 and 56. 115 Al-
though many traces of the pre-Code law may be found in these sections there
are significant changes, one of the most important of which is the separation of
the requirements of good faith and notice." 7 Under section 3-302(1)(b) of the
114 U.C.C. S 3-302 provides:
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense
against or claim to it on the part of any person.
Id.
" Section 3-304 is set out here in its entirety. Only subsection (I) of that section in fact
corresponds to section 56 of the N.I.L.:
5 3-304: Notice to Purchaser.
(1) The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense if
(a) the instrument is so incomplete, bears such visible evidence of forgery or
alteration, or is otherwise so irregular as to call into question its validity,
terms or ownership or to create an ambiguity as to the party to pay; or
(b) the purchaser has notice that the obligation of any party is voidable in
whole or in part, or that all parties have been discharged.
(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against the instrument when he has
knowledge that the fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in payment of or as
security for his own debt or in any transaction for his own benefit or otherwise
in breach of duty.
(3) The purchaser has notice that an instrument is overdue if he has reason to
know
(a) that any part of the principal amount is overdue or that there is an uncured
default in payment of another instrument of the same series; or
(b) that acceleration of the instrument has been made; or
(c) that he is taking a demand instrument after demand has been made or
more than a reasonable length of time after its issue. A reasonable time for
a check drawn and payable within the states and territories of the United
States and the District of Columbia is presumed to be thirty days.
(4) Knowledge of the following facts does not of itself give the purchaser notice of
a defense or claim
(a) that the instrument is antedated or postdated;
(b) that it was issued or negotiated in return for an executory promise or ac-
companied by a separate agreement, unless the purchaser has notice that a
defense or claim has arisen from the terms thereof;
(c) that any party has signed for accommodation;
(d) that an incomplete instrument has been completed, unless the purchaser
has notice of any improper completion;
(e) that any person negotiating the instrument is or was a fiduciary;
(I) that there has been default in payment of interest on the instrument or in
payment of any other instrument, except one of the same series.
(5) The filing or recording of a document does not of itself constitute notice within
the provisions of this Article to a person who would be a holder in due course.
(6) To be effective notice must be received at such time and in such manner as to
give a reasonable opportunity to act on it.
U.C.C. $ 3-304,
116
 Official Comments to U.C.C. 55 3-320 and 3-304.
117
 In Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Leo's Used Car Exch., Inc., 291 N.E.2d 603 (Mass.
1973), the court pointed out that the question of good faith is determined by an inquiry into the
honesty of the purchaser, and not into his diligence or negligence. Those considerations, how-
ever, go to the question of notice. Id. at 606. See also Oscar Gruss & Son v. First State Bank of
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U.C.C., a holder who seeks the status of holder in due course must establish" 8
that he took the instrument in good faith. The draftsmen of the U.C.C. origi-
nally attempted to make this test of good faith subject not only to the honesty of
the holder, but also to reasonable commercial standards. The attempt, how-
ever was foiled"' and the test of good faith continues to be satisfied, as it was in
pre-Code law, by a showing of subjectively honest conduct."° Nevertheless,
the objective test is not entirely dead. In addition to establishing that he was
honest and therefore in good faith, under section 3-302(1)(c) the holder also has
to show"' that he took the instrument without notice of any claim or defense' 22
to the instrument. ' 23 As the following examination of section 3-304 reveals, this
Eldorado, 24 U.C.C. REP, SERV. 1251, 1259 (7th Cir. 1978); Suit & Wells Equipment Co. v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank, 282 A.2d 109 (Md. 1971); First State Bank & Trust Co. v. George, 519
S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1974).
118 The burden of establishing both good faith and lack of notice is placed upon the
holder by 5 3-307(3) which requires him to establish by affirmative proof all the elements of
S 3-302. See, e.g., United Securities Corp. v. Bruton, 213 A.2d 892 (D.C. 1965); HIMC Invest-
ment Co. v. Siciliano, 103 N.J. Super. 27, 246 A.2d 502 (1968); Oklahoma Nat'l Bank v. Equi-
table Credit Finance Co., 489 P.2d 1331 (Okla. 1971); Peoples Bank of Aurora v. Haar, 421
P.2d 817 (Okla. 1966). But see Western State Bank v. First Union Bank & Trust Co., 360 N.E.2d
254 (Ind. 1977). The position is the same in article 8, in which one who claims the status of a
bona fide purchaser bears the burden of showing that he satisfied the prerequisites of the status.
Oscar Gruss & Son v. First State Bank of Eldorado, 24 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1251, 1262 (7th Cir.
1978). This burden only arises if the defendant first established the existence of a viable defense.
Hollywood Nat'l Bank v. I.B.M. Corp., 38 Cal. App. 2d 607, 113 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1974)
(relating to securities under article 8); Ritz v. Karstenson, 39 III. App. 3d 877, 350 N.E.2d 870
(1976) (relating to a holder in due course of an instrument).
"° LLEWELLYN, supra note 104, at 181 n.182, attributes this failure to "Nile blinder
and less informed of the New York City bar, the bankers in general, and history-igno-
rance . . . ." The 1952 official text of the U.C.C. required that a holder, in order to acquire the
status of a holder in due course, take the instrument in good faith, including observance of ..
reasonable commercial standards ... ." U.C.C. 5 3-302(1)(b) (1952 version). Llewellyn saw
this inclusion of an objective criterion as a return to the common law from which the courts had
strayed. The provision was generally criticized during the hearings before the New York Law
Revision Commission as renewing an objective test that had not been required either during or
prior to the currency of the N.I.L. See N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n Report, supra note 23, at 203;
Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 812-22
(1958); Penney, supra note 83, at 998-99; Braucher, supra note 83, at 66-67; see also Third Nat'l
Bank v. Hardi Gardens Supply of Ill., Inc., 380 F. Supp. 930 (M.D. Tenn. 1974). The element
of reasonable commercial standards of course remains part of the the requirement of good faith
for a merchant in article 2.
"° Third Nat'l Bank v. Hardi Gardens Supply of Ill., Inc., 380 F. Supp. 930 (M.D.
Tenn. 1974); Central Bank & Trust Co. v. First Northwest Bank, 332 F. Supp. 1166 (E.D. Mo.
1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1972); Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Leo's Used Car Exch., Inc.,
291 N.E.2d 603 (Mass. 1973); Mid Continent Nat'l Bank v. Bank of Independence, 523 S.W.2d
569 (Mo. 1975); McConnico v. Third Nat'l Bank, 499 S.W.2d 894 (Tenn. 1973); Von Gohren
v. Pacific Nat'l Bank of Washington, 505 P.2d 467 (Wash. 1973); Van Horn v. Van De Wol,
Inc., 6 Wash. App. 959, 497 P.2d 252 (1972).
"' On the question of burden of proof, see note 118 supra.
122 Essentially, a defense is a right to resist payment in a suit on the instrument while a
claim is a right to the instrument based on an equity of ownership in the instrument. See Fulton
Nat'l Bank v. Delco Corp., 128 Ga. App. 16, 195 S.E.2d 455 (1973); Lakeshore Commercial
Finance Corp. v. Bradford Arms Corp., 45 Wis. 2d 313, 173 N.W.2d 165 (1970).
I" See cases cited in note 117 supra.
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requirement compensates for the subjective good faith test and reintroduces the
objective element into the determination of the holder in due course status.' 24
Consequently, the holder in due course once again is treated more like a bona
fide purchaser in other areas.
When the U.C.C. was first drafted, some commentators lamented this
tampering with traditional principles, and they expressed concern that such
tampering would result in the imposition of a greater burden of inquiry on the
holder of an instrument, thereby impairing the free movement of commercial
paper. 125
 Notwithstanding that criticism, the change sought to clarify and ra-
tionalize what had been a confused area of law. Some courts readily grasped
the import of the new provisions of the U.C.C., and interpreted them in ac-
cordance with their spirit and purpose. 126
 Others continued to base their opin-
ions on cases decided under the N.I.L., apparently oblivious to the different
approach of the two statutes.'" This regrettable trend has continued to ob-
1 " Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank, 85 Cal. App. 3d 797, 149
Cal. Rptr. 883 (1978); HART & WILLIER, COMMERCIAL PAPER, 2 BENDER'S U.C.C. SERVICE
5 1105, point out that it could be dangerous to distinguish good faith and notice on the basis of
the subjective or objective criteria for determining their absence or presence. They feel that such
a distinction involves a risk of generalization in a case where clear statutory language exists.
Nevertheless they concede the distinction is useful. In fact it is indispensable to any inquiry into
the principles that underlie the distinction.
1 " Britton, Holder in Due Course — A Comparison of the Provisions of the N. I. L. with Those of
Art. 3 of the Proposed Commercial Code, 49 Nw. U.L. REV. 417 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Brittonj.
26 See cases cited in note 117 supra. In Oscar Gruss & Son v. First State Bank of
Eldorado, 24 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1251 (7th Cir. 1978), the Seventh Circuit observed that the
confusion that has arisen in cases decided after the U.C.C. resulted from the pre-Code mingling
of good faith and notice requirements, and noted that the confusion has made the resolution of
disputes in the area more complex than need be. See also Salter v. Vanotti, 26 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
964, 967 (Colo. 1979).
' 7
 There are several cases in which the spectre of the N.I.L.'s purely subjective stand-
ard has manifested itself to haunt post-Code courts. In Universal C.I.T. Corp. v. Ingel, 347
Mass. 119 (1964), the Massachusetts court initially held that the notice contemplated by 3-302
(1)(c) was subjectively determined. The court revised that view and the official report of the case
was amended to bring the opinion into accord with the objective criteria set out in S 1-201(25).
The First Circuit appeared to labor under a similar misconception of the notice standard in Bowl-
ing Green, Inc. v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 425 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1970), in which it stated
that "[t]he code defines 'good faith' as 'honest in fact' . . an essentially subjective test which
focuses on the state of mind of the person in question. The code definition of notice ... (in
S 1-201(25)) while considerably more prolix, also focuses on the actual knowledge of the in-
dividuals allegedly notified." Id. at 85. The court below in that case did not seem to entertain the
same misconceptions. Bowling Green, Inc. v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 307 F. Supp. 648
(D. Mass. 1969). In Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Fort Lee Say. & Loan Ass'n, 89 N.J. Super. 43, 213
A.2d 315 (1965), the court unquestioningly applied pre-Code authority based on the subjective
test of the N.I.L. in determining whether or not a purchaser of an instrument had notice under
S 3-302 of New Jersey's U.C.C. The court ignored 3-304 and its new standards. See also Third
Nat'l Bank v. Hardi Gardens Supply of Ill., Inc., 380 F. Supp, 930 (M.D. Tenn, 1974); O.P.
Ganjo, Inc. v. Tri-Urban Realty Co., 108 N.J. Super. 517, 261 A.2d 722 (1969). In St. Cloud
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Sobriana Constr. Co., 302 Minn. 71, 224 N.W.2d 746 (1974), the
confusion appears to have caused one of the parties to have missed a valuable argument which
was not raised on appeal. See also HART & WILLIER, COMMERCIAL PAPER, 2 BENDER'S U.C.C.
SERVICE 5 11.05.
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fuscate an area that now should be clear and has cast doubt upon the standard
of inquiry expected of the holder of a negotiable instrument. 128
The preceding discussion outlined the general approach adopted by article
3 to the question of notice to holders in due course, and it showed the consider-
able confusion generated as a result of some courts' continued adherence to
policies the U.C.C. sought to abandon. In the ensuing section, an examination
of section 3-304 will reveal the detailed provisions that give effect to the U.C.C.
approach. It will demonstrate that continued reliance on cases decided under
the N.I.L. or at common law is inapposite.
B. The Notice Requirements of Section 3-304
1. Constructive Notice
The U.C.C.'s constructive notice provision for holders in due course is
found in section 3-304(I)(a). It is the successor to section 52(1) of the N.I.L. 129
Section 52(1) represented the one exception to the general rule that the N.I.L.
was concerned only with the factual state of mind of the holder. Under section
52(1), where the instrument was not regular or complete upon its face, it was
not relevant to inquire into the holder's subjective appreciation of the patent ir-
regularity."° Notice of the irregularity would be attributed to him whether or
1 " There is some indication that this confusion between objective and subjective stand-
ards has not been confined to article 3, and that it has occasionally spilled over into other areas of
the U.C.C. See, e.g., Hollywood Nat'l Bank v. I.B.M. Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 607, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 494 (1974), in which the court merged the concepts of good faith and notice in the case of a
bona fide purchaser under 5 8-302. Notwithstanding any pre-Code authority, there is no longer
cause for such a merger. The U.C.C. requires both standards to be met. Cf. Matthysse v.
Securities Processing Services, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (interpreting New
York's variation of 5 8-304, which includes the following language as subsection (3): "Except as
provided in this section, to constitute notice of an adverse claim or a defense, the purchaser must
have knowledge of the claim or defense or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the
security amounts to bad faith.").
Two states, New York and Virginia, have deliberately retained the subjective standard
of 5 56 of the N.I.L., which they incorporated into 5 3-304 by a non-uniform subsection 3-307(7)
which reads as follows:
In any event, to constitute notice of a claim or defense, the purchaser must have
knowledge of the claim or defense or knowledge of such facts that his action in tak-
ing the instrument amounts to bad faith. If the purchaser is an organization and
maintains within the organization reasonable routines for communicating signifi-
cant information to the appropriate part of the organization apparently concerned,
the individual conducting the transaction on behalf of the purchaser must have the
knowledge.
New York subsequently amended this subsection by the deletion of the final sentence.
This non-uniform provision, which followed upon a recommendation of the New York
Law Revision Commission, gutted the reformist ingredient of section 3-304 and was received
with misgivings by commentators at the time of its enactment. See Braucher, supra note 83, at
67-68; Penney, supra note 83, at 998-1000; Virginia Note, supra note 36, at 1353; Penney, A Sum-
mary of Articles 3 and 4 and Their Impact in New York, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 47, 59-61 (1962).
1 " N.I.L. $ 52(1) provides in relevant part: "A holder in due course is a holder who has
taken the instrument under the following conditions: (1) That it is complete and regular upon its
face . . . ." Id,
"° Id. Rightmire, supra note 104, at 364-65; Harvard Note, supra note 107; BRITTON,
supra note 93, at 283.
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not he examined the instrument, and whether or not he was aware of the ir-
regularity.' 3 ' Under both statutes such notice attributed to a purchaser acts as
an absolute bar to his acquisition of holder in due course status. A purchaser
who fails to achieve the status takes subject not only to defenses that arise from
the infirmity itself, but also to all other defenses on the instrument that may be
raised against one who is not a holder in due course. 132
 The purchaser's knowl-
edge or lack of knowledge of such defenses is just as irrelevant as his state of
knowledge with regard to the infirmity on the instrument.
Despite these general similarities, the U.C.C. and the N.I.L. are distinct-
ly different in approach. While section 52(1) of the N.I.L. imposed the broad
and rather vague standard that the instrument must be complete and regular
on its face, section 3-304(1)(a) eschews that broad statement of principle, and
instead sets out a catalogue of facts that lead to the same basic conclusion —
that the instrument was incomplete or irregular. By being more specific, the
U.C.C. draftsmen hoped to eliminate some of the difficulties that arose from
the imprecise wording of its predecessor.I 33
 In addition, the draftsmen chose to
use superlative language in order to emphasize that the purchaser of an instru-,
ment only is treated as having constructive notice of material, almost glaring,
irregularities in the instrument. Consequently, the holder is only accountable
for those irregularities which would excite suspicion in a reasonable person' 34
that the instrument is not viable either in regard to its terms or in regard to its
title.'"
The irregularity must of course be in the instrument itself, not in some ac-
' 3 ' BRITTON, supra note 125, at 434; Virginia Note, supra note 36, at 1352.
"2 BRiTroN, supra note 125, at 434; Virginia Note, supra note 36, at 1352. See also
Citizens State Bank v. Pauly, 152 Kan. 152, 102 P.2d 966 (1940) (the irregularity in the note
rendered it non-negotiable). Keisel v. Baldock, 55 Okla. 487, 154 P. 1194 (1915).
1 " See $ 3-304, Comment 2. One example of such a difficulty that has been avoided by
the more precise working of 3-304(1)(a) is the treatment of blanks under the N.I.L. and the
U.C.C. Under the N.I.L. a person could not be a holder in due course of an instrument that con-
tained a material omission. All blanks had to be filled in before the holder in due course took the
instrument. See N.I.L. 5 4; F. BEUTEL, BRANNAN'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 694-97;
BRADY, BANK CHECKS 5 8.12, at 5 8.24 (5th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as BRADY'. Under the
U.C.C. an omission of material matter from an instrument will not preclude the acquisition of
holder in due course status unless the omission calls into question the validity of the instrument.
A holder could, for example, fill in its own name on an instrument that omits the name of the
payee and still qualify as a . holder in due course. United States v. Second Nat'l Bank, 502 F.2d
535 (5th Cir. 1974).
194
 The effect of the irregularity must be measured against the objective standard of a
reasonable person exercising normal commercial practices. Western State Bank v. First Union
Bank & Trust Co., 360 N.E.2d 254 (Ind. 1977).
195 Comment 2 to 5 3-304 talks of alterations that do not excite suspicion, and concludes
by observing: "[i]rregularity is properly a question of notice to the purchaser of something
wrong, and is so treated here." See also Morris, Negotiable Instruments under the U.C.C., 64 W. VA.
L. REV. 457, 509 (1962); First Nat'l Bank v. Otto Huber & Sons, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1284
(D.S.D. 1975). Irregularities of this type should be distinguished from matter on the instrument
that goes to the very negotiability of the instrument itself. If the instrument is rendered non-
negotiable because it contains a conditional promise, or is uncertain as to time of payment or
amount payable then the transferee of the instrument is deprived of the status of holder in due
course absolutely, not because he has notice of the defect attributed to him, but because the
nature of the instrument is such that it cannot be held in due course.
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companying document, for the absolute notice provisions of section 3-304(1)(a)
to apply.'" It is not necessary, however, that the irregularity be intrinsic in the
instrument itself and determinable without reference to any outside circum-
stances. The question whether or not an instrument is irregular must be tested
not only in the light of the provisions of the U.C.C. or any other applicable
statute, but also in the light of the likely reaction of a reasonable person in the
commercial context. Therefore, even if the instrument is intrinsically sound, in
the sense that it is fully negotiable and valid under article 3, it may still be ir-
regular if it is so unusual that it would be viewed with suspicion in the relevant
commercial setting.'"
In sum, if the instrument is blighted by an irregularity of sufficient magni-
tude, then under section 3-304(1)(a) the holder is charged absolutely with
notice of the irregularity irrespective of his appreciation of it. If the irregularity
or infirmity is of lesser dimensions, then subsection (1)(a) will not apply, and
the impact of the irregularity will be judged by the standards set out in sections
3-304(1)(b) and 1-201(25) for determining actual notice."° In the latter in-
stance, the purchaser will be found to have notice of a claim or defense that
emerges from an irregularity only if he had actual knowledge of such claim or
defense or reason to know of it.'"
Most courts do not articulate, or even recognize this distinction. As a
result, the inquiry into notice in the case of irregularities on an instrument is
often dealt with in a rather amorphous way.'" Nevertheless, the results usually
conform with the underlying spirit of the section, and support the general prop-
osition that irregularities, omissions, or alterations on an instrument that a
reasonable person would not accept as immaterial will not preclude the holder
of the instrument from acquiring it in due course. On the basis of this princi-
"6 Leininger v. Anderson, 255 N.W.2d 22, 28 (Minn. 1977).
'" Western State Bank v. First Union Bank & Trust Co., 360 N.E.2d 254 (Ind. 1977),
held that even where certificates of deposit were valid and negotiable under article 3 and other
statutory requirements, they would be irregular under S 3-304(1)(a) if they so deviated from ac-
cepted banking customs that a reasonably prudent man exercising normal commercial judgment
would be put on notice that there was something irregular about them. The court held that where
such irregularity arising out of usage or custom is in issue, the burden is on the person relying on
the usage to prove it.
1 " See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank, 85 Cal. App. 3d
797, 149 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1978); O.P. Ganjo, Inc. v. Tri-Urban Realty Co., 108 N. J. Super.
517, 261 A,2d 722 (1969).
19 This issue is discussed in text at notes 150-54 infra. Of course, it is conceivable that a
purchaser might have notification of an irregularity, in which case notice by notification may be
ascribed to him. As a practical matter, notification is not likely to arise as an issue in this context.
"G A review of the cases cited in notes 141-43 infra will attest to this amorphous treat-
ment. See also Sun & Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 24 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 667 (Cal.
1978). This approach is understandable in view of the fact that circumstances are often am-
biguous and will support either an argument based on the irregularity of the instrument or on the
purchaser's reason to know of a defense or claim. See, e.g., Winter & Hirsch, Inc. v. Passarelli,
122 Ill. App. 2d 372, 259 N.E.2d 312 (1970), in which the court would have treated as an ir-
regularity under S 3-304(1)(a) circumstances that would have been handled more comfortably
under S 3-304(1)(b). In addition, the fact that both the constructive notice standard and the
"reason to know" test contain, in different measures, a degree of objectivity, it is rather easy to
think of them in the same light. Western State Bank v. First Union Bank & Trust Co., 360
N.E.2d 254 (Ind. 1977).
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ple, purchasers of instruments have been held to be holders in due course
where the instrument in question contained blanks, 14 ' where it was obviously
completed by someone other than the drawer, 142
 where it was altered,'" or
where there were discrepancies between words and figures.'" This approach is
a revolutionary one. In fact, as a general rule section 52(1) of the N.I.L.
similarly was interpreted to apply only to material irregularities"' and the sub-
stance of the law in this area has not changed significantly.
This rule, which applies to irregularities in form, applies equally to nota-
tions, memoranda, or other facts appearing on the instrument. Either those
facts on the instrument will be significant and suspicious enough to be held,
against the purchaser under subsection (1)(a) irrespective of his awareness of
them, or they will be considered along with any other relevant facts, in deter-
mining whether under subsection (1)(b) the holder had actual notice of some
claim or defense.'" Purely narrative matter on an instrument is not sufficient
to put a purchaser on notice of some claim or defense arising out of the trans-
action or relationship described in the narration unless there is some danger
signal that would alert the purchaser to such defense."'
Although the results reached by the courts under the approach of N.I.L.
1 " United States v. Second Nat'l Bank, 502 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1974).
142
 Steelman v. Associates Discount Corp., 121 Ga. App. 649, 175 S.E.2d 62 (1970);
Saka v. Sahara-Nevada Corp., 92 Nev. 703, 558 P.2d 535 (1976); Central State Bank v. Kilroy,
57 A.D.2d 940, 395 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1977). In fact, express statutory language supports this hold-
ing. U.C.C. S 3-304(4)(d) provides that it is only knowledge of improper incompletion, not mere
knowledge of fact of completion of the instrument that will constitute notice of a defense or claim.
See also U.C.C. 5 3-115, which creates a presumption of authorized completion.
1 " In National State Bank of Elizabeth v. Kleinberg, 4 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 100 (N.Y.
1967), a note for $52,000 was stated on its face as being payable in ten weekly installments of
$1,000, and an eleventh installment of $41,000. The amount of the balance was altered to
$42,000. The court allowed the alteration as the correction of an arithmetical error which ob-
viously appeared from the face of the instrument. But see National Acceptance Corp. v. Henne,
194 So. 2d 434 (La. 1967), in which the amount written on the instrument in ink by the drawer
was erased and new figures typed over the erasure. The alteration was obvious to the eye, and
was held to render the instrument irregular on its face under S 52(1) of the N.I.L. The same
result would follow under U.C.C. S 3-304(1)(a).
14
 McCook County Nat'l Bank v. Compton, 558 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1977).
142
 A collection of pre-Code cases can be found in F. BEUTEL, BRANNAN'S NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW 692.97.
146
 Some matter on an instrument, for example a restrictive endorsement, or an en-
dorsement without recourse will be governed by specific rules set out in the U.C.C. See U.C.C.
$$ 3-205, 3-206, 3-414. The fact that an instrument was signed without recourse was not treated
as an infirmity under the N.I.L., nor it is so treated under the U.C.C. See Werbel v. Mullen, 11
N.J. 40, 93 A.2d 367 (1952). However, the taker of an instrument bearing such a qualified en-
dorsement is held to such endorsement, not by operation of the doctrine of notice, but on prin-
ciples of contract liability under article 3.
147 U.C.C. 5 3-304(4). See also, e.g., Eldon's Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch,
296 Minn. 130, 207 N.W.2d 282 (1973). A similar approach was adopted under the N.I.L. It
was only clear irregularities appearing on the face of the instrument that would fall within the
constructive notice provisions of S 52(1). Thus a purchaser would be charged with notice of a
material blank in the instrument, or a mark of dishonor or restrictive endorsement. However,
where a fact noted on the instrument fell short of an irregularity it would be treated in the same
way as a fact dehors the instrument, and the holder would be charged with notice of such fact on-
ly if the provisions of 5 56 were satisfied. See generally Harvard Note, supra note 107, at 321.
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section 52(1) are generally consistent with the underlying purpose of U.C.C.
section 3-304(1), use of this outmoded methodology should be avoided as con-
trary to the literal terms of section 3-304(1). Section 3-304(1) forms part of the
analytic scheme established under the U.C.C. to unify the notice doctrine in
commercial law. Failure to adhere to the scheme either because of an applica-
tion of outmoded standards, or by a disregard of the distinction between ab-
solute and actual notice frustrates that goal.
2. Actual Notice
The treatment of actual notice in article 3, is found in section
3-304(1)(b) 118
 and in sections 3-304(2)-(6). These sections must be read in con-
junction with section 1-201(25). 149
 In this light the holder is charged with notice
of a claim or defense under section 3-304(1)(b) where he had actual knowl-
edge,'" notification,'" or reason to know'" either that the obligation of a party
was voidable or that all parties had been discharged.
Actual knowledge of the voidability or discharge corresponds in some
measure to the standard set out by section 56 of the N.I.L.,'" although the
divorce of the good faith and notice requirements does theoretically restrict the
inquiry. Under section 56 it was necessary not only to investigate the presence
of knowledge in the mind of the holder, but also to make a determination of the
effect of that knowledge on his bona fides in taking the instrument. The word-
ing of section 3-305(1)(b) requires only a consideration of the absence or
presence of actual knowledge and does not prescribe the further step of assess-
ing the holder's honesty in taking the instrument in the light of that knowledge.
The distinction is not usually significant for practical purposes because it
follows as a matter of course in most cases that one who takes with knowledge
of such infirmities will lack good faith in acquiring the instrument.
Section 3-304(1)(b) nevertheless is radically different from N.I.L. section
56 because it charges a holder with notice not only where he has actual knowl-
edge but also where he has reason to know of the voidability or discharge. As a
result, the holder of an instrument is judged under section 3-304(1)(b) in the
same way as other bona fide purchasers are judged under the U.C.C., using
the yardstick of reasonable diligence to decide whether notice of a fact should
be attributed to him.'" As is the case with notice under subsection (1)(a), if the
18 The section is set out in full in note 115 supra.
1}8
 The section is set out in full in the text at note 15 supra.
"° U.C.C. 5 1-201(25)(a).
Ill U.C.C. 1-201(25)(b). A discussion of the meaning of notification may be found in
the text at notes 31-42 supra. As indicated there, notice by notification is a variety of constructive
notice, not actual notice.
181 U.C.C. 5 1-201(25)(c). Note that recording is ineffective as constructive notice to the
holder of a negotiable instrument. This accords with the general principle and is also specifically
provided for in §§ 3-304(5) and 9-309. Sec also National Surety Fire v. Mazzara, 268 So. 2d 814
(Ala. 1972).
" 3
 Billingsley v. Mackay, 382 F.2d 290, 291-92 (5th Cir. 1967) (Heebe, J., dissenting).
". Von Gohren v. Pacific Nat'l Bank of Washington, 8 Wash. App. 245, 505 P.2d 467
(1973). See also cases cited in notes 68-74 supra.
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holder is charged with notice of a claim or defense under subsection (1)(b) he
will not enjoy the protection afforded to a holder in due course, and will take
subject to any defenses that may be asserted against a holder on the instrument
whether or not they have any relationship to the defense of which he has
notice. 15 Although the nature of the inquiry under section 3-304(1)(a) is
similar to other notice inquiries under the U.C.C., its scope is far narrower.
As the plain wording of section 3-304(1)(b) indicates, only notice of two
particular types is relevant to the question whether or not a holder has notice of
a claim or defense. The first type is notice that the obligation of any party is
voidable in whole or in part. The second is notice that all parties have been dis-
charged. 156
 Section 3-304(1)(b) therefore requires a double inquiry. First, it
must be established whether there are facts that would render the obligation of
a party voidable or would discharge all parties. Second, it must be ascertained
whether the purchaser of the instrument had notice of such facts.
The provision which relates to notice that all parties have been discharged
appears to be of little practical significance. Discharge is governed by part 6 of
article 3. Section 3-601 sets out an index of the situations in which the liability
of a party may be discharged. However, both sections 3-602 and 3-305(2)(e)
make it clear that such a discharge will not avail against a holder in due course
who has no notice of it. This aspect of section 3-304(1)(b) therefore seems to be
functionless for if the holder had noticed that all parties were discharged he
would not have been successful in suing any of them in the first place. Each of
them could have raised the defense of discharge against him under section
3-305(2)(e).' 57
The issue of what constitutes a voidable obligation is addressed in com-
ment 3 to section 3-304. The comment distinguishes defenses that would avoid
the original obligation on the instrument from those that are in the nature of
set-offs or counterclaims. Section 3-306 permits an obligor on an instrument to
assert all defenses against a holder that could be asserted in an action on a sim-
ple contract. That would include not only defenses that arise out of the contract
itself but also those that derive from collateral relationships and would be avail-
able to the defendant as a set-off against the contractual obligation. Although a
set-off may be raised against one who is not a holder in due course, comment 3
makes it clear that notice of set-off will not preclude attainment of holder in due
iss BRITTON, supra note 125, at 436, illustrates the principle by the following example: A
payee obtains the instrument fraudulently from the drawer. An agent of the payee negotiates the
instrument to the holder in payment of his own debt, in circumstances in which the holder is
charged with notice of the payee's claim to the instrument. That notice disqualifies the holder
from being a holder in due course and he would be subject not only to a claim to the instrument
by the payee, but also to the personal defense of fraud (in the inducement) by the drawer. See also
WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 477 (1972); BRITTON, supra note 93, at
117.
136
 The N.LL.'s formulation was indifferent; it required that the holder take the instru-
ment without "notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person
negotiating it." N.I.L. S 52(4).
'" Virginia Note, supra note 36, at 1353.
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course status. To make an obligation voidable the defense must inhere either in
the obligation that underlies the instrument or in the instrument itself. 158
Although comment 3 to section 3-304 mentions only defenses and says
nothing of claims, the section by its terms extends both to claims and defenses,
and the omission in the comment should not be interpreted to suggest the con-
trary. It is certainly conceivable that in some cases a claim made to an instru-
ment by a third party will not affect the obligations of the parties to the instru-
ment, who will be fully bound to whichever claimant is found to have title to it.
In other circumstances, however, where the claimant is also a party to the in-
strument, his claim, if established, will result in the avoidance of his obligation
to the holder under the instrument. Therefore, a drawer might draw a check in
favor of a payee and issue it to him on condition that he will not deal with or
negotiate it until he has performed a reciprocal obligation. If the payee, while
failing to perform, does in fact negotiate the check to a third person who has
notice of the breach of the condition, then that third person may not be a holder
in due course. He had notice of a claim to the instrument on the part of the
drawer which would render his obligation on the instrument voidable. 159
For the most part the provisions of U.C.C. sections 3-304 and 3-306 have
successfully retained the traditional elements of notice as applied to negotiable
instruments while bringing this specialized doctrine of notice more closely in
line with notice requirements in other areas of commercial law. If this delicate
balance is not fully understood, however, the result is likely to be greater confu-
sion rather than less. Although precedents based on prior law or drawn from
other notice provisions in the U.C.C. can be useful, blind reliance on such
cases is dangerous. The notice requirements for holders in due course remain
unique and must be treated as such.
C. Special Cases of Notice Under Article 3
1. Notice Where a Fiduciary Negotiates an Instrument
Subsections (2) and (3) of section 3-304 expand upon the general prin-
ciples set out above. Subsection (2) deals with cases where a fiduciary
'" An illustration of this principle is found in Davenport v. Unicapital Corp., 230
S. E.2d 905 (S.C. 1976). The holder of the instrument was held to have notice of a defense where
it was apparent from the face of an accompanying contract that an usurious rate of interest was
being charged. Under a South Carolina statute, a debtor charged usurious interest may recover
an amount equal to the interest provided for in the agreement plus double the interest actually
paid to the creditor. That recovery, may be had either in a separate action or in a counterclaim in
an action on the contract. The court held that the debtor's obligation was voidable to the extent of
his claim for penal damages. The case conforms to the spirit of 5 3-304(1)(b). Even though the
debtor's claim is in the nature of a set off or counterclaim, it arises out of the obligation underly-
ing the instrument itself.
159 In Factors & Note Buyers, Inc. v. Green Lane, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 43, 245 A.2d
223 (1968), the court, on facts similar to the situation described in the text, came to the opposite
conclusion partly on the grounds that the claim arose from facts outside of the instrument rather
than on the instrument itself. The opinion, which is based on the court's reading of 5 3-304(4)(b)
rather than on an interpretation of the provisions of 5 3-304(1)(b), seems to suggest that it is only
defenses arising out of the negotiable instrument itself, rather than the underlying obligation,
that will be relevant in deciding whether the holder had notice. Such restriction on 3-304 is not
within the wording or the spirit of the section.
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negotiate an instrument. Subsection (3) concerns notice that an instrument is
overdue or has been dishonored.
Subsection (2) deals with the specific case of a fiduciary who has negoti-
ated an instrument in breach of his fiduciary duty.' 6° Where the purchaser of
the instrument has knowledge"' both that the transferor is a fiduciary and that
he is applying the principal's instrument to his own ends or in some other un-
authorized manner, the purchaser is treated as having notice that the principal
has claim to the instrument.' 62 As a result the purchaser does not qualify as a
holder in due course.' 63
 Knowledge of both elements is necessary. Mere knowl-
edge that the transferor is a fiduciary is not in itself sufficient to place the pur-
chaser on notice.'" Thus subsection (2) conforms to the general principles of
notice under article 3. In fact, it seems that in the absence of subsection (2), a
purchaser who had knowledge of the facts described in the subsection would be
treated at least as having reason to know"' of a claim against the instrument
and the same result would follow.
The N.I.L. contained no provision equivalent to subsection (2), which
' 6° Prior to the deliberations of the New York Law Revision Commission, 3.304(2)
provided for two specific cases in which a purchaser of an instrument would have notice of a
claim against it. One of them related to fiduciaries, and corresponded roughly to the present pro-
vision now under consideration. The other charged a purchaser with notice of a claim if he had
reasonable grounds to believe that the transfer of the instrument to him was a preference voidable
under the law of bankruptcy or insolvency. That ground of notice was eliminated upon the
recommendation of the Commission, 1 N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n Report, supra note 23, at
206-07, 243-44, which pointed out: "If the transfer of the instrument is a voidable preference the
bankruptcy court may adjudicate accordingly and the claim of the holder against the bankrupt
estate will be determined on that basis. On the other hand, if the bankruptcy court does not make
that determination it is difficult to see why that defense should be valid against a transferee for
value." Id. at 207. See also Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Sidney Gotowner, Inc., 4 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
953 (N.Y. 1967).
161 Note that the word "knowledge" is used. That means actual knowledge, not notice.
The distinction is discussed in the text at notes 15-19 supra. Official texts of the U.C.C. up to
1952 charged the purchaser with notice of the claim against the instrument if he had reasonable
grounds to believe that the fiduciary had acted in the manner described. In the 1957 official text the
objective standard was replaced with the present subjective test of knowledge.
162 Maley v. East Side Bank of Chicago, 361 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1966); McKirgan v.
American Hospital Supply Corp., 37 Md. App. 85, 375 A.2d 591 (1977); McConnico v. Third
Nat'l Bank, 499 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. 1973).
163 Notice under U.C.C. 3-304(2) may not only be relevant to holder in due course
status, but may also enter the question of whether or not an action based on negligence may lie
against a banker. See Swiss Baco Skyline Logging, Inc. v. Haliewicz, 18 Wash. App. 21, 567
P.2d 1141 (1977).
164 This is expressly stated in 3-304(4)(e). See also U .0 .0 . 3-206(4); Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co. v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank, 85 Cal. App. 3d 797, 149 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1978); Leininger v.
Anderson, 255 N.W.2d 22 (Minn. 1977); Eldon's Super Fresh Stores v. Merrill Lynch, 296
Minn. 130, 207 N.W.2d 282 (1973); Breslin v. New Jersey Investors, 70 N. J. 466, 361 A.2d 1
(1976); McConnico v. Third Nat'l Bank, 499 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. 1973); Richardson Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 504 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1974).
165 Von Gohren v. Pacific Nat'l Bank of Washington, 8 Wash. App. 245, 505 P.2d 467
(1973). Beutel, Comparison of the Proposed Commercial Code, Article 3, and the N. I. L. , 30 NEB. L. REV.
531, 548 (1951), says this subsection contemplates constructive notice of the principal's claim.
That is a misstatement in the context of the distinctions employed in the U.C.C. The notice is ac-
tual notice based on the purchaser's reason to know (or possibly on his actual knowledge in some
factual settings).
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was inspired by sections 5 and 6 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act.'" Instead the
N.I.L. relied exclusively on a subjective test. In spite of the subjective test
prescribed by section 56, however, the treated knowledge regarding a
fiduciary's appropriation of his principal's instrument as notice of a defect in
the title of the fiduciary."'
Although the term "fiduciary" is not defined in the U.C.C., it was de-
fined in section 1(1) of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act,'" and comment 5 to sec-
tion 3-304 of the U.C.C. states that the U.C.C. provision follows the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act. 169
It should be noted that subsection (2) applies only where the fiduciary has
negotiated the instrument. Therefore it would have no application where the
fiduciary has drawn or made an instrument on behalf of his principal in pay-
ment of his own debt,"° or where he uses an instrument drawn by his principal
166 See Comment 5 to 5 3-304. Sections 5 & 6 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act read as
follows:
5 5: Check Drawn by Fiduciary Payable to Third Person. — If a check or other bill
of exchange is drawn by a fiduciary as such, or in the name of his principal by a
fiduciary empowered to draw such instrument in the name of his principal, the
payee is not bound to inquire whether the fiduciary is committing a breach of his
obligation as fiduciary in drawing or delivering the instrument, and is not charge-
able with notice that the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as
fiduciary unless he takes the instrument with actual knowledge of such breach or
with knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounts to
bad faith. If, however, such instrument is payable to a personal creditor of the
fiduciary and delivered to the creditor in payment of or as security for a personal
debt of the fiduciary to the actual knowledge of the creditor, or is drawn and
delivered in any transaction known by the payee to be for the personal benefit of
the fiduciary, the creditor or other payee is liable to the principal if the fiduciary in
fact commits a breach of his obligation as fiduciary in drawing or delivering the in-
strument.
5 6: Check Drawn by and Payable to Fiduciary. — If a check or other bill of ex-
change is drawn by a fiduciary as such or in the name of his principal by a
fiduciary empowered to draw such instrument in the name of his principal, pay-
able to the fiduciary personally, or payable to a third person and by him trans-
ferred to the fiduciary, and is thereafter transferred by the fiduciary, whether in
payment of a personal debt of the fiduciary or otherwise, the transferee is not
bound to inquire whether the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as
fiduciary in transferring the instrument, and is not chargeable with notice that the
fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary unless he takes the
instrument with actual knowledge of such breach or with knowledge of such facts
that his action in taking the instrument amounts to bad faith.
'" Uniform Fiduciaries Act, Commissioners note to 55 5 and 6 suggests that the prac-
tice had grown up in the courts of abandoning the subjective good faith test for notice in cases
where a fiduciary relationship appeared on the instrument, and of unconsciously substituting an
objective test of negligence. See generally BRITTON, supra note 93, at 289-92.
in Section 1(1) of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act defines a fiduciary to include:
A trustee under any trust, expressed, implied, resulting or constructive, executor,
administrator, guardian, conservator, curator, receiver, trustee in bankruptcy,
assignee for the benefit of creditors, partner, agent, officer of a corporation, public
or private, public officer, or any other person acting in a fiduciary capacity for any




170 This appears to have been overlooked in Breslin v. New Jersey Investors, 70 N.J.
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in favor of the holder to pay not the principal's indebtedness to the holder but
his own. In that type of situation the question of whether the holder had notice
of a claim or defense should be determined by the general rules set out in sec-
tion 3-304(1)(b). The practical result will in most cases be the same."'
2. Notice that an Instrument is Overdue or Dishonored
In addition to notice of defenses against or claims to the instrument, sec-
tion 3-302(1)(c) penalizes those with notice that the instrument is overdue or
that it has been dishonored.'" The circumstances that result in dishonor of an
instrument are set out in section 3-507. A discussion of the rules relating to dis-
honor, and of its consequences are beyond the scope of this article, and it suf-
fices to note that the fact of dishonor, like the fact of a claim or defense to the in-
strument, is a relevant issue in any inquiry relating to notice. With respect to
dishonor, once it is established, the question of the holder's notice of it must be
decided. If notice is established, the holder is deprived of the status of holder in
due course whether or not the dishonor had any direct bearing on the defense
that is to be raised.
Section 3-304, however, is silent on the question of notice relating to dis-
honor. Therefore, notice of dishonor must be established under the general
notice provision, section 1-201(25). As a result, in many respects the notice
issue in cases of dishonor will be subject to the same principles as that in the
case of claims and defenses. Both actual knowledge and imputed knowledge of
dishonor results in a holder being charged with notice of the dishonor. There is
one significant difference between notice of dishonor and notice of claims or
defenses. As was pointed out in the general discussion of section 1-201(25),
constructive notice only is attributed to a purchaser in cases where it is specifi-
cally authorized by the In the case of matter appearing on the instru-
ment, there is no provision in section 1-201(25) charging the holder absolutely
with notice covered by section 3-304(1)(a). Accordingly, if marks of dishonor
appear on the instrument itself, there is no basis for charging the holder with
notice of dishonor irrespective of his state of mind.'" There must be an inquiry
into the existence of either actual knowledge or reason to know of dishonor,
and in such a case the notation on the instrument will be merely a factual ingre-
dient to be considered.
By contrast, notice that an instrument is overdue is dealt with specifically
in section 3-304(3). That section sets out five separate factual settings that will
result in a holder being charged with notice that the instrument is overdue. The
466, 361 A.2d 1 (1976). In Eldon's Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, 296 Minn. 130,
207 N.W.2d 282 (1973), the court recognized the point, but held nevertheless that an instrument
issued to a holder must be treated the same as one negotiated to a holder.
'" This is because the facts will frequently lead to the conclusion that the holder had
knowledge or reason to know of the principal's claim. BRADY, supra note 133, at 8.17 n.16
seems to miss this point, and suggests a solution based on a breach of good faith. Id.
1 ' The N.I.L. contained an equivalent provision in $ 52(2).
'" A mark of dishonor on the instrument does not make the instrument incomplete, nor
is it evidence of forgery or alteration, nor is it an irregularity which affects the validity or owner-
ship of the instrument. Neither will it create any ambiguity as to the party to pay. Hence there is
no language in 3-304(1)(a) which comfortably fits the case of dishonor.
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section provides a special definition of notice. It provides that notice that an in-
strument is overdue is constituted only in cases in which the transferee had
reason to know or actually knew of the circumstances set out.
The wording of section 3-304(3) leads to two observations. First, as in the
case of notice that the instrument has been dishonored, there is no provision for
constructive notice that an instrument is overdue. Therefore, the apprehension
of the holder is the only relevant consideration. 174 Second, the standard for
measuring that apprehension is different from the general standard set out in
section 1-201(25)(c). The test set out in section 1-201(25)(c) has been described
as a quasi-objective one in which inquiry must first be made into the pur-
chaser's subjective awareness of base facts before a conclusion of notice of ulti-
mate facts, predicated upon the reasonable inference from the base facts, can
be drawn. That test arises from the wording in section 1-201(25) that the pur-
chaser's reason to know derives from "all the facts and circumstances known to
him .. . ." That wording is absent from section 3-304(3), and the omission
has prompted at least one writer to wonder whether the quasi-objective test has
been excluded from section 3-304(3) and substituted by a purely objective
standard that takes the inquiry of reasonable appreciation further back into the
circumstances of the transaction.'" While this is a plausible reading of section
3-304(3), it is not clear that this was the intended design of the draftsmen, and
there is no obvious reason for eliminating these subjective elements of the
notice inquiry here.
Whether or not an objective or quasi-objective test is employed, section
3-304(3) by its terms defines what facts must be served to establish notice that
the instrument is overdue, and, therefore, it must be interpreted as being ex-
haustive of the situations in which such notice is attributed to a holder. The
holder only is charged with notice where he has reason to know either (a) that
the principal amount' 76 or any part of it is overdue,'" (b) that there is a default
in another instrument of the same series" 8 and that such default has not been
cured, (c) that there has been an acceleration of the instrument, (d) that the in-
strument is a demand instrument' 79 and demand has already been made at the
' 7+ The cases have not clearly articulated this distinction. In Srochi v. Kamensky, 118
Ga. App. 182, 162 S. E.2d 889 (1968), the fact that the note was overdue both appeared from its
face, and was found to have been known by the holder.
"5 Virginia Note, supra note 36, at 1349. The official comment is not much help in
deciding whether or not the omission was deliberate. Comment 7 speaks of notice only in general
terms, as does comment 1 to $ 3-302.
16 The section applies only to notice that the principal amount is overdue. Notice that
interest is overdue is not enough to place the purchaser on notice, and is specifically excluded by
$ 3-304(4)(0. The rule is a codification of case law under the N.I.L. See supra note 107, at 54-55.
" 7 This subsection applies to instruments payable at a definite time, as defined in
5 3-109. See generally E. F . Corp. v. Smith, 496 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1974); Srochi v. Kamensky,
118 Ga. App. 182, 162 S.E.2d 889 (1968); Capital Investors Co. v. Estate of Morrison, 484 F.2d
1157 (4th Cir. 1973).
179 Default on an instrument other than on the same series does not constitute notice and
is excluded expressly in 5 3-304(4)(f). Central State Bank v. Kilroy, 57 A.D.2d 940, 395
N.Y.S.2d 78 (1977).
19 Defined in U.C.C. 5 3-108.
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time of taking it, or (e) that the instrument is a demand instrument and he is
taking it more than a reasonable length of time after its issue.'"
In general, section 3-304(3), covering notice that an instrument is overdue
or has been dishonored, and section 3-304(2), covering notice of a principal's
claim where an instrument has been negotiated by a fiduciary, are primarily
clarifying provisions. They describe when circumstances exist that make it rea-
sonable to impute knowledge of a defect in an instrument. Although they are
specialized provisions, they are not truly exceptions to the doctrine of notice
provided in article 3.
CONCLUSION
The edges of the doctrine of notice have been tattered and frayed for a
long time. Confusion has resulted not only from different conceptual defini-
tions, but also from a failure to keep principles separate and distinct. The en-
actment of the U.C.C., with its generally straightforward and universal ap-
proach to notice, granted an opportunity to clarify and rationalize the confus-
ing complexities which had developed in pre-Code law. In many cases the
spirit of the U.C.C. has been conscientiously applied, yet for a number of
reasons, ranging from the accommodation of the special interests of commer-
cial groups on the.one hand, to sloppy statutory interpretation on the other, the
pre-Code conceptions continue to cling tenaciously to the doctrine of notice
almost twenty years after its reform. Perhaps it is time to look more carefully at
the purpose of and the place occupied by the doctrine in the U.C.C.
14° Section 3-304(3)(c) specifies that a reasonable time after issue, in the case of a
domestic check, is presumed to be 30 days, As comment 7 to 3-304 indicates, the presumption
may be overturned under § 1-201(31) by evidence showing a different period to be reasonable
under the circumstances of the case. In the case of instruments which are not domestic checks (or
where a period other than 30 days is alleged as a reasonable time for the life of a domestic check)
the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the instrument, trade usage, and banking
practices will have to be looked at in order to establish the appropriate period. U.C.C.
3-503(2). See also Gill v. Commonwealth Nat'l Bank, 504 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1973).
